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In my dissertation I studied the political economy of economic development
as well as the the urban wage premium, all using data from Brazil. In the
first chapter, which is joint work with Carlos Varjão, we analyze the effect
that increased political opposition in the city council has on corruption and
public service provision at the local level. In the second chapter I study the
sources of the high wage premium observed in cities, including firm sorting,
firm and occupational matching, and compensating wage differentials. Finally,
in the third chapter I study what happens to the provision of public education
when a school teacher is elected to the city council (which actually occurs quite
frequently). More detailed summaries of each chapter follow below.
Chapter 1: In “Political Opposition, Legislative Oversight, and the Per-
formance of the Executive Branch”, we study the effect that increased political
opposition has on corruption and other measures of the mayor’s performance in
Brazil. The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches
is a cornerstone of democracy. This system of checks and balances, however,
can be circumvented by partisan loyalties if legislators strategically avoid ex-
erting oversight when their own party controls the executive branch. It is thus
an empirical question whether the separation of powers prevents the abuse of
power in practice. We answer this question by measuring the extent to which
members of political opposition parties in a city council effectively check the
mayor’s performance in Brazil. We employ a regression discontinuity design to
estimate the causal effect of an additional politically opposed legislator, and
we find that political opposition increases oversight action and decreases cor-
ruption, with the effect fully concentrated on mayors facing reelection pressure.
We trace the impact of oversight, via a reduction in healthcare spending ir-
regularities, all the way to impacts on healthcare service delivery and health
outcomes.
Chapter 2: In “Decomposing the Urban Wage Premium in Brazil: Firms,
Matching, and Compensating Wage Differentials” I study the sources of the
high wage premium observed in cities. In this chapter I used detailed employer-
employee matched data from Brazil to understand 3 important elements of the
urban wage premium: (1) the role of firms sorting into cities, (2) the role of
firm and occupational matching in creating agglomeration economies, and (3)
the role of compensating wage differentials. I first exploit identification from
multi-city firms to show that positive selection of high-wage firms into larger
cities accounts for 44% of what is often considered ‘agglomeration economies’.
Then I show that improved firm and occupational matching together account
for 87% of agglomeration effects. I then turn my attention to compensating
wage differentials— a possible explanation for the high-wage firms in cities. I
estimate revealed-preference valuation of jobs, and show that jobs in cities in
fact have better non-wage characteristics, and so high urban wages cannot be
due to compensating wage differentials. This evidence together suggests that in
Brazil, cities exist because they provide thick labor markets where high-wage
firms and high-wage workers can go to find productive matches.
Chapter 3: In “Teachers in Politics: Teacher-Politicians, Gender, and the
Representation of Public Education” I study what happens to public education
in a city when a school teacher is elected to the city council, and I find that it
depends on the gender of the teacher. Using a regression discontinuity design
that exploits close elections, I find that when a female teacher is elected to the
city council, the city hires both more teachers and more qualified teachers, and
pays them more. Having a female teacher on the city council also increases
the likelihood that the city’s schools have necessary teaching resources, books,
and financing, and possibly increases student test scores. No significant effect
is found for male teachers elected to the city council. This difference may
be due to different political career concerns for men versus women, a simple
amplification of existing gender policy preference differences, or some mixture
of the two.
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Chapter 1
Political Opposition, Legislative Oversight, and
the Performance of the Executive Branch
1.1 Introduction
The separation of powers between government branches is a central tenet of lib-
eral democracy. While the executive branch implements policies, the legislative
branch has oversight responsibilities that can deter the abuse of power. But
these institutional checks can be circumvented if partisan legislators strate-
gically avoid exerting oversight when their own party controls the executive
branch.1 Hence, the effectiveness of separation of powers in practice depends
critically on the degree of partisan competition, yet this has received little at-
tention in the literature. While theory gives some guidance on this issue (Person
et al, 1997, 2000; and Acemoglu et al, 2013; for example), there is little em-
pirical work evaluating how well legislative oversight prevents rent seeking in
practice.
In this paper, we provide direct evidence on the role that partisan competi-
tion has on curtailing corruption under the separation of powers. Particularly,
we measure the extent to which political opposition parties in a city council pro-
vide a binding check on a mayor’s performance and thus enhance the quality
of public services in Brazil.
Intuitively, legislators’ incentives to inform voters about a mayor’s wrongdo-
ings should depend on their party affiliation, since electoral prospects of mayors
1In fact, legal scholars Levinson and Pildes (2006) make the case that the true separation
of powers is the separation of power between political parties, not branches of government.
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and legislators from the same party are usually closely aligned. Hence, allied
legislators have little incentive to investigate and report a mayor’s corrupt ac-
tivities since this can hurt their own reelection prospects. On the other hand,
opposition legislators could perhaps improve their reelection chances by expos-
ing a corrupt mayor. Moreover, this check on corruption should mainly be
effective when the incumbent mayor is not term limited and cares about the
impact of being exposed on his reelection chances. We formalize this intuition
by adapting a canonical political agency model (Besley, 2006) to accommodate
legislators’ partisan incentives to provide information to voters. The model
predicts that when mayors with reelection incentives face strong legislative op-
position, there should be more oversight investigations and less corruption.
To test these predictions, we use a regression discontinuity (RD) design
to estimate the causal impact of an additional political opponent in the city
council on mayoral performance.2 We follow a body of literature that exploits
close elections as an RD design (Lee, 2008; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Caughey
and Sekhon, 2011; Eggers et al., 2015), so that the estimator compares mu-
nicipalities where the opposition party just barely won an additional seat in
the legislature to those where the opposition (by a small margin) did not win
an additional seat. We trace the effects of partisan opposition through four
links in the underlying causal chain. We find that legislative opposition: (i)
increases legislative oversight activities, (ii) decreases corrupt activities by the
mayor (particularly in the health sector), (iii) improves the quality of public
health service provision, and (iv) enhances health outcomes.
More specifically, we first substantiate a mechanism through which opposi-
tion legislators constrain the executive. The creation of a Parliamentary Com-
mission of Inquiry (CPI) is a major oversight instrument that legislative bodies
in Brazil have, and the president of the city council - which is elected by the
2As these councils are small (typically 9 members) one additional opposition legislator
represents a substantial increase in the opposition seat share and frequently flips the legislative
majority towards opposition control.
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city council itself - plays an essential role for the creation and effectiveness of
CPIs. The city council president decides whether a CPI has a valid reason to
be created, and if so, appoints legislators to the commission. We show that an
additional opposition party legislator increases the probability that an opposi-
tion legislator is city council president by 14 p.p and increases the likelihood
that an investigative commission is created to look into mayors’ wrongdoings
by 6 p.p. (55% increase).
Second, we assess if this increase in oversight inhibits rent-seeking behavior.
We find that an additional opposition party legislator reduces the instances of
corruption found by auditors by 0.846 standard deviation units, with the impact
fully concentrated on mayors with reelection incentives. We also find that the
benefits of reduced corruption are concentrated in reducing irregularities in
healthcare spending. This makes sense given that municipalities have a great
deal of control over the quality of local healthcare provision and the fact that
healthcare is one of the most salient issues for voters and politicians in Brazil
(Fujiwara, 2015).
Third, we look at whether this reduction in embezzlement of health funds
improves public service delivery, which would happen if decrease in embezzle-
ment increases the likelihood that government resources reach their intended
health programs. Our estimates suggest that this is indeed the case; an ad-
ditional opposition legislator increases the probability that a physician will be
present at the local public health clinic, decreases waiting lines, and reduces
irregular hiring practices of health workers.
Fourth, we find evidence that this improvement in public health service
provision translates into better health outcomes. Results suggest that for un-
educated mothers (those most likely to depend on public health services), one
additional opposition legislator decreases infant mortality by 3.4 per 1000 births
and the rate of preterm births by 0.8 per 1000 births. This impact of legislative
3
oversight on health outcomes is large and robust to various specifications and
falsification tests.
Regarding mechanisms, we test for heterogeneous effects based on which
seat is captured by the extra opposition legislator. We find evidence that the
impact of an additional opposition legislator is driven by situations when it flips
the majority in the local city council, although results of a seat by seat analysis
are imprecise due to small sample sizes. This result suggests that to promote
effective oversight, the opposition needs to control key institutional features—
like launching an investigative commission— that are only available once they
have a majority in the legislative branch.
We also test two of the main mechanisms in the model. First, we provide
evidence of partisan differentiated incentives for oversight by showing that the
electoral prospects of mayors and legislators from the same party— but not the
opposition— are closely aligned. Using the fact that the timing of the public
dissemination of the federal audit results is random (Ferraz and Finan, 2008),
we show that when a mayor is revealed to be corrupt and there is an AM
radio station present to disseminate findings, electoral success of mayor-allied
legislators falls by 10 p.p., but there is no effect for opposition legislators. Addi-
tionally, we evaluate whether the presence of opposition legislators reduces the
reelection chances of incumbent mayors. Opposing legislators reduce reelection
chances of mayors when reelection incentives are not strong enough to force
mayors to pretend to be non-corrupt, even when they know that they will be
reported by legislators and this will end up costing their reelection. Results
suggest that an additional opposition legislator decreases mayors’ reelection
chances by 6.2 p.p.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the effectiveness of the
separation of powers in preventing abuses of power depends on the degree of
partisan competition. We do so by exploiting exogenous variation in the number
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of politically opposed legislators, and showing its effect on a chain of outcomes
ranging from politician behavior to the welfare of constituents. This relates to
the literature on political institutions and politician performance. While this
literature has principally considered the direct effect of electoral incentives on
performance (Cascio and Washington, 2013; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011; Ferraz and
Finan, 2011; Lim, 2013; Martinez-Bravo et al. 2014; Fujiwara, 2015; Gulzar
and Pasquale, 2017), a much smaller strand of this literature has examined
the effect of checks from other branches of government (Alt and Lassen, 2008;
Litschig and Zamboni, 2015).3 So while previous literature shows that voters
keep politicians in line, we show that the system of checks and balances allows
politicians to keep other politicians in line. 4
Our results further relate to the literature on divided government. Alesina
and Rosenthal (1996) build a model where the election of a divided government
arises from moderate voters preferring moderate policies. This paper proposes
another rationale for the formation of divided government: to incentivize good
performance from the executive. This could be part of the explanation for the
high degree of split-ticket voting in Latin America (Ames et al. 2009), a region
with high corruption and poor public services. While much attention has also
been given to the potential of divided government to generate legislative grid-
lock (Fiorina, 1992; Krehbiel, 1998; Mayhew, 1991; Nzelibe and Stephenson,
2009), there is little investigation on the potential of divided government to
reduce rent extraction by the executive.
There is also a large recent literature that studies the impact of centralized
audits on corruption and public service provision (Olken, 2007; Ferraz and
Finan, 2008; Litschig and Zamboni, 2016; Nishijima, Ellis, and Cati, 2016,
Lichand et al., 2016; Avis, Ferraz, and Finan, 2018). Our work can be seen
3Related to these checks from other branches of government, Britto and Fiorin (2016)
show that larger city council sizes in Brazil increase corruption.
4We also contribute to a related literature on democracy and welfare (Besley and Ku-
damatsu, 2006; Kudamatsu, 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2014; Fujiwara 2015; Madsen et al. 2015)
by documenting how a specific democratic feature can improve citizens’ well-being.
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as complementary to this literature, since we study the effect of the auditing
unit that is already built in to many democracies— the legislative branch.
Our analysis suggests that strengthening legislative oversight, by ensuring that
legislative branches have both the authority and capacity to investigate the
executive branch, could be an effective way to improve politician performance.
This article is also a contribution to the literature on political partisanship and
corruption (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz, 2013; Eggers, 2014), which finds
that voters are more tolerant of corruption in their own political party. This
paper shows that this result also holds for politicians, and that this tolerance
has negative impacts on outcomes such as health.
1.2 Institutional Background
Brazil is a federal republic much like the United States. There are 3 spheres of
government: the federal government, the states, and the municipalities. Exec-
utive and legislative branches exist in all three spheres and are directly elected.
Municipal governments in Brazil are made up of of the mayor, his or her
appointed secretaries, and the city council (Câmara de Vereadores). As the
executive branch, the mayor and secretaries are responsible for implementing
laws and policies through the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, and
so on. Mayors face a two-term limit, and thus do not face reelection incentives
during their second term. As the legislative branch, the city council is given the
responsibility to (1) make laws, and (2) audit and review municipal spending,
which includes reviewing the accounts of the mayor and his or her secretaries.
Internally, the city council elects a board of directors— a president, vice-
president, and secretaries— which serves a purpose similar to the speaker of the
house in the U.S. House of Representatives. Among other things, this board
is responsible for proposing projects and authorizing procurement of public
goods. The city council’s twofold responsibility will require a corrupt mayor
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to either buy off the city council, or find some other way to get around them.
If monitoring responsibilities are divided up among city councillors, more city
councillors from opposing parties may make it more difficult to steal money or
exert low effort. Corruption frequently manifests itself in the form of fraudelent
projects, which must be approved by the city council. More opposing politicians
in the legislature could mean more power to block these projects from being
approved. Thus, the legislature could improve executive performance and/or
restrain the executive’s rent-seeking either through (1) legislation it does or
does not choose to pass or (2) through its auditing responsibilities.
If city councilors notice some irregularities in the mayor’s accounts, they are
charged with creating a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) in order to
investigate possible malfeasance. Legislators may threaten the executive with
denunciation, but if they are politically opposed, these threats will be much
more credible both because political leverage stands to be gained and because
politicians may not want their political enemies to have access to additional
resources gained from rents.
The creation of CPIs is a right of legislative bodies at municipal, state and
federal level guaranteed by the Brazilian constitution5. CPIs need the approval
of 1/3 of the legislative body to be initiated. A CPI must be created with
a very specific purpose and a time limit (usually 6 months). The CPI has
judicial investigative powers. It can have access to bank, telephone and tax
information and can call witnesses to be interrogated. The CPI ends with a
document describing all the findings of the investigation and is passed forward
to prosecutors to take the appropriate actions. The city council can also use
the wrongdoings uncovered by the investigation to impeach the mayor.
The leader of the city council plays an important role in the effectiveness
of the CPI. Local city council leaders are elected by the city council itself, are
responsible for deciding if the purpose of the investigation is narrow enough
5Art. 58 Paragraph 3
7
for the commission to be created, and are also responsible for deciding which
legislators that will work on the CPI6. Once a CPI is created, it elects a president
who is responsible to guide the investigations. Hence, it is common practice
for council leaders— if allied with the mayor— to claim that the CPI does not
have a well defined purpose to block it or create a CPI with legislators that
have no interest in investigating the mayor.
Some examples are useful to illustrate how allies of the mayor can block
the creation or effective investigation by CPIs. In 2015, a councilman in the
municipality of Nova Friburgo in the state of Rio de Janeiro tried 2 times
to create a CPI to investigate irregularities in the procurement process for
medicine acquisition by the municipal government. Although he had enough
votes to create the CPI, the leader of the city council (who is from the same
party as the mayor) did not aprove the CPI because he claimed that the purpose
of the investigation was not narrow enough7. Two months later, the leader of
the city council approved the creation of the CPI due to popular pressure.
Another example comes from the city of Rio de Janeiro. Opposition legisla-
tors wanted to create a CPI to investigate several reports of schemes to defraud
procurement contracts on municipal public works for the 2016 Olympics. Again,
although the opposition had enough votes to create the CPI, the city council
leader (who is from the same party as the mayor) claimed that the purpose of
the investigation was too broad and did not approve the creation of the CPI.
The opposition went to the courts and a judge decided that the purpose of
the investigation was very well defined and ordered the city council president
to accept the creation of the CPI8. After the CPI was created, the city coun-
cil leader decided that 4 of the 5 members of the commission would be from
the mayor’s party. The opposition did not accept this, claiming that with this
6In principle, he should respect the party composition of the house, but this is commonly





composition the investigation would be compromised. The investigations have
been suspended since then9.
As the examples above illustrate, it can be extremely hard for the opposi-
tion to exert effective oversight of the executive actions if it does not have a
substantial presence in the city council.
On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence that suggests that corrup-
tion in Brazil may be institutionalized and that party doesn’t matter; in other
words, corruption could be largely due to ‘cultural norms’. As one Brazilian
anticorruption organization has said, ‘It seems there is some unwritten pact, a
type of code of honor among the corrupt... and they meet their terms, even
when they are political enemies’ (Chizzotti et al. 2012). Corruption schemes
may be inhereted from previous administrations, despite the transfer of power
from one party to another, with city councillors recieving monthly payments
from the mayor to keep quiet.
Politics is highly fragmented in Brazil due to a proportional represention
system— in our data 25 different parties had mayors elected in the munici-
palities of Brazil. This fragmentation makes pure majorities in the legislature
almost impossible to get, and so coalitions are key to getting representatives
elected and advancing a policy agenda. Four main parties dominate the politi-
cal landscape in Brazil, with smaller parties generally allying themselves with
larger parties according to current political issues. Parties form coalitions for
the election of both mayors and legislators, with candidates running under a
specific party and coalition. These political coalitions are seen by some as
exacerbating the problem of corruption. Coalitions between parties are often
formed based on promises to be fulfilled after the election, which could lead to
fraudelent schemes in order to transfer money to party leaders as a reward. In




coalitions in proportional elections, but the legislation did not pass.
Brazil has an open party-list proportional system where seats are allocated
according to the D’Hondt Method10, which will be discussed later as an impor-
tant part of our identification strategy. The D’Hondt Method is widely used—
44 countries11 in the world use some form of it, principally in Europe and Latin
America. The findings in this paper will have important implications for the
merits of the D’Hondt Method versus alternative methods like the Webster
Method12 or the Huntington-Hill Method13.
Brazilian municipalitites are an ideal setting to study the effect of political
opposition on politician performance because we can observe a cross-section
of thousands similar local-level governments, and because governance is highly




One of the most difficult parts of studying corruption or politician effort is
getting accurate and informative data. In this paper we use rich data pro-
vided by an anticorruption program in Brazil. Beginning in the year 2003,
the Brazilian Federal Government began a lottery program in which every few
months, municipalities from across the country would be randomly chosen to
10First introduced by Thomas Jefferson to allocate seats to states in the US House of Rep-
resentatives, but it is most often associated with the Belgian mathematician Victor D’Hondt
who introduced it a century later
11According to Wikipedia, these are Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Guatemala,
Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,
Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Scotland, Ser-
bia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, and Wales.
12Introduced by American statesman Daniel Webster. This method was formerly used to
allocate seats to the states in the US House of Representatives.
13This is the method currently in use to allocate seats to states in the US House of Rep-
resentatives; however, it is not currently used by any legislature to allocate seats to parties.
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be audited with respect to all federal funds they had received in recent years.
When a city is chosen by the lottery, a team of federal employees spends a
few weeks in the city, inspecting receipts, budgets, bank statements, as well
as the physical premises of projects targeted by federal monies, to ensure that
projects have taken place. Programs audited include primary schooling, health
clinics, poverty relief, and road construction. Audits are administered by the
Controller-General of the Union (CGU), an agency within the System of Inter-
nal Control of the federal government’s executive branch. The federal auditors
are highly paid and trained professionals, and Ferraz and Finan (2008) find no
evidence that they are successfully bribed by municipal governments to manip-
ulate audit reports.
After being in the city for a few weeks reviewing documents, federal auditors
write up a report (usually between 50 and 200 pages) listing all ‘irregularities’
pertaining to each program and service item14 within the program, including
how much money was involved in each project and service item. About 80%
of funds audited are related to either health, education or social programs. We
use data from audits performed during the 3 mayoral terms from 2005-2016.15
Our data comes requested from the CGU, and lists all irregularities found in
audits from the 20th to the 40th lottery.
Following classifications in Ferraz and Finan (2011), we examine 3 main
types of corruption found in the reports: (1) embezzlement (diversion of funds),
(2) fraud in procurement, and (3) overinvoicing. In the reports, what these re-
spectively look like is (1) the local government spends public money and doesn’t
prove where it went (presumably transferred to private bank accounts, etc.);
(2) the bidding process for public projects is simulated or manipulated, either
using fake firms or ‘friendly’ firms; or (3) government officials pay higher-than-
14A ‘service item’ indicates a given set of transfers from the federal government to the
municipal government for a given program. This term has been used interchangebly with the
term ‘service order’ in the literature that uses these audit reports.
15Terms are 4 years long
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market prices for goods or projects (and then presumably receive a kickback
from the private providers). As outcome variables we use each of these 3 types
of corruption, an aggregate corruption variable, as well an aggregate of all other
irregularities not classified as embezzlement, fraud, or overinvoicing. This in-
cludes serious procedural errors and other irregularities.
In our data, we observe all irregularities found by auditors over the 1,200
audits performed from the years 2006 to 2015.16 In order to create measures
for corruption, we use regular expressions (i.e. keywords search) to search for
words and phrases that isolate an irregularity as corruption. Details on these
regular expressions can be found in the appendix in section 1.11. Given the
regular expressions we use, it is clear that our fraud and overinvoicing variables
are measuring corruption at some level of the government (whether the mayor
directly or his or her subordinates). Our embezzlement variable measures situ-
ations in which money was spent by the municipal government and there are no
receipts or documents showing that the money was actually spent as specified,
thus opening the way for diverting public resources for private purposes. While
some of these could be mere procedural errors, we present evidence in the re-
sults section that they are generally not. Our measure of corruption is very
closed related to Ferraz and Finan (2011). The main difference is that instead
of reading the reports and manually classifying corruption episodes like Ferraz
and Finan (2011), we use this regular expression method to classify corruption
episodes.17
Audit reports are subdivided by ministry (of health, education, etc.) and
then by service item, and the CGU classifies each irregularity as either ‘major’
or ‘minor’ based on potential monetary losses to the government. Our main
16We omit the data from lotteries 29 and 30 because these audits happened in the second
half of the first year of a term, making it unclear if corruption findings are due to the current
or previous administration. Corruption found in audits performed in the first 6 months of a
term are attributed to the previous administration.
17So while we did not read all the reports, we did read a large sample of the reports in
order to know which expressions and phrases regularly indicated that corruption had taken
place.
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corruption outcome variables will be the amount of service items found to have
been involved in each type of corruption that were defined as ‘major’ irregular-
ities by the CGU. The variable ‘Total Corruption’ is the sum of irregularities
associated with embezzlement, fraud, or overinvoicing, for each municipality.
Summary statistics are provided in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Audit Data Summary Statistics
count mean sd min max
Total Audit Service Items 788 24.01269 9.552229 7 95
Total Corruption 788 .8109137 1.598453 0 13
Embezzlement 788 .2525381 .7634811 0 8
Fraud 788 .2918782 .8910597 0 8
Overinvoicing 788 .3274112 .9977917 0 12
Other Irregularities 788 3.332487 3.435536 0 30
Each variable is the count of audit service items where the given type of irregularity was
found and also classified as a ‘major’ irregularity by the CGU.
The unit of observation is an audited municipality and the sample is audited municipalities
between 2006 and 2015 that fit the requirements for the RD design (detailed in section 3.4.1).
1.3.2 Public Service Provision Data
When the CGU sent auditors to inspect documents for the program outlined
above, they also surveyed local residents to assess the quality of public service
provision, particularly to assess the quality of Brazil’s Family Health Plan (Pro-
grama Saúde da Famı́lia). A high fraction of healthcare in Brazil is provided
by the government (Family Health Plan covers over 90% of Brazilians) and is
implemented at the local level. For the poor of Brazil, Family Health Plan is
generally their only way to receive care. If public funds are being stolen, mu-
nicipal health clinics will be underfunded and will not be able to provide people
with proper healthcare. Similarly, if the municipal government is exerting low
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effort, healthcare providers may not be hired or incentivized to come to work,
and people will not recieve care.
In each municipality, CGU auditors picked a random sample of residents to
interview (22 families on average) and asked a series of questions relating to
the quality of care received at local health clinics. In addition, this dataset also
has nonsurvey data in which the auditors assessed the quality of public service
provision based on documentation provided by the local government, including
if Community Health Agents (CHA)18 had been hired by irregular means. The
questions asked are shown in table 3.2 in the appendix and summary statistics
are provided in panel A of table 1.2.
18Community Health Agents in Brazil are government employees (within the Brazilian
Unified Health System) with only basic healthcare training and report to a physician or
nurse. They are generally selected from members of the community and make regular visits
to families and promote good health.
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Table 1.2: Healthcare Data Summary Statistics
Panel A: Survey Data
count mean sd
Nurse Present 5334 .9478815 .2222868
Dentist Present 4386 .7763338 .4167484
Physician Present 5359 .8303788 .3753347
Irregular Hiring 487 .3326489 .4716465
Lines at Health Unit 5278 .5617658 .4962173
CHA Visits 6730 .9257058 .2622686
Panel B: DATASUS Data
Preterm Rate, Uned 45191 8.960052 7.841882
Infant Mort. Rate, Uned 45192 14.76405 30.48358
Preterm Rate, Educ. 45258 8.147874 5.623468
Infant Mort. Rate, Educ. 45260 8.873812 17.66823
The unit of observation of all variables in panel A is a respondent in an audited
municipality and all variables are binary indicating the respondent’s answer
to the questions in table 3.2. Sample sizes differ slightly by variable because
some respondents may not have needed to see each type of medical professional
during their last visit. The ‘Irregular Hiring’ variable has much lower sample
size because it is based on responses of auditors rather than survey respondents.
Panel B contains infant health indicators for uneducated and educated mothers.
Preterm rate is the fraction of births born before 37 weeks, infant mortality
rate is the number of infant deaths per 1000 live births. The unit of observation
is municipality-year between 2005 and 2016. In both panels we only include
municipalities that fit the requirements for the RD design (detailed in section 3.4.1)
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1.3.3 Health Outcome Data
If poor politician performance has an adverse affect on public service provi-
sion, we may expect to see some negative effect on outcomes that these public
programs are targeted at. Thus, we investigate the effect that the marginal
opposing city counselor has on two infant health outcomes: fraction of infants
born preterm19 (before 37 weeks) and the infant mortality rate per 1000 live
births. We obtain this data from DATASUS, the data arm of Brazil’s Uni-
fied Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde), the system that implements the
Family Health Program. One advantage of this dataset is that unlike the CGU
data, this data is available for every year in our sample and almost every mu-
nicipality in Brazil (around 5,500). Thus we have a very high sample size and
thousands of clusters.
Underfunding of Brazil’s Family Health Program is most likely to affect
low-income families who depend on it for their healthcare (wealthier families
generally seek private care; Alves and Timmins, 2003). While health outcomes
are not available by income level, they are available by education level. Thus,
we classify mothers who received 1-7 years of schooling as ‘uneducated’ and
mothers who received 8+ years of schooling as ‘educated’.20 In our data 34%
of births are to uneducated mothers, 64% are to educated mothers, and 2% of
mother’s education levels are unreported. Summary statistics are in panel B of
table 1.2.21
19Medical research shows that there a link between receiving adequate prenatal care and
having a preterm birth. See Vintzileos et al. (2002)
20This is similar to the classification in Fujiwara (2015), though Fujiwara classifies ‘un-
educated’ mothers as recieving 1-9 years of schooling. Though it may be ideal to reuse
Fujiwara’s classification, education level data for mothers is only provided in bins, and the
Brazilian government reported the data in different bins during the period we study.
21While only 2% of mother’s education levels are unreported for births, 35% of mother’s
education levels are unreported for infant deaths, leading to some measurement error for
the infant mortality rate for educated or uneducated mothers. We assume this is because
healthcare workers are in general less preoccupied with gathering this information from a
mother after she has lost her infant, regardless of her educational attainment. However, even
if lower education mothers are more likely to have their education levels unrecorded, our RD
design still ensures that this measurement error is uncorrelated with regressors, and thus it
will not bias our estimates.
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1.3.4 CPI
We constructed the dataset on the creation of CPIs by searching on Google for
any news reporting the creation of a CPI22 in a municipality between the years of
2013 and 201623. To limit the scope of this data collection, we follow Cattaneo et
al. (2015) and use a data-driven method of determining the bandwidth around
which treatment can be considered as if random. The method basically amounts
to performing balance checks for a vector of covariates with successively smaller
bandwidths until you can fail to reject that all the covariates are balanced at a
conservative level. We performed these checks using the 12 covariates that we
use for our placebo test in Table 4 and arrived at a bandwidth that includes
674 municipalities.
1.3.5 Election Data
We observe data on all candidates, parties, coalitions, votes received, and seats
won, for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 Brazilian municipal elections. This data is
available on the website of the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil (TSE). The
identity of council leaders in 2005 comes from the database ”Censo Legislativo
2005”.
The summary statistics in table 1.3 paint a picture of what the average
city council looks like. We can see that on average the city council has 9.3
seats and that there are about 4.6 different coalitions of parties competing for
votes. While various separate coalitions may compete with one another in the
elections for city council, multiple coalitions often unite into one super-coalition
for the election of a single candidate for mayor. Thus the average mayor has 1.8
coalitions that supported him or her in the election. On average the mayor’s
coalition wins 4.8 of the seats in the city council, and as we can see from table
22We did not include CPIs that explicitly investigated only acts of legislators and not the
executive.
23We focus on the most recent mayor term because it is the easiest one to find news report
online.
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1.20, the typical mayor’s coalition is the highest ranked coalition in terms of
vote share. As seen in figure 1.9 in the appendix, in the bulk of municipalities,
the opposing coalition has between 33% and 55% of the seats.
Table 1.3: Municipality Characteristic Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (S.D.) Variable Mean (S.D.) .
Tot. City Council Seats 9.311 AM Radio 0.213
(1.963) (0.409)
Second Term Mayor 0.279 TV Station 0.102
(0.448) (0.302)
Mayor’s Coalitions’s seats 4.767 Urbanization Rate 63.263
(1.548) (21.978)
Num. Coalitions in Municipality 4.654 Illiteracy Rate 16.36
(2.5) (9.862)
Num. Coalitions Supporting Mayor 1.852 Avg. Monthly Income 433.133
(1.105) (196.475)
Mayor Coalition Rank 1.462 Population 2010 34135.8
(0.818) (224619.0)
Anti-Mayor Coalition Vote Share 50.688 Tot. Votes Cast 17692.5
(14.251) (116821.2)
Opposition Seat Share 0.484
(0.155)
Observations 4192 4192
Municipalities fitting the requirements for the RD design (detailed in section 3.4.1) in the 2004 election
(the year corresponding to most of the audit data). Means are presented in the main row, standard deviations
are below in parenthesis.
18
1.4 Theoretical Framework
We present here a simple two-period24 political agency model modified to in-
clude a legislative body to guide the interpretation of our empirical results.
The main objective of this model is to illustrate how equilibrium legislative
investigations, corruption and mayor’s reelection rates can differ when there is
a strong legislative opposition versus when there is not.
There is one voter (v), one incumbent mayor (ma), one challenger (mb) and
two legislature candidates (la and lb) each coming from a party a or b. If the
mayor and the legislator are from the same party25, we will call this an unified
government and if the mayor and the legislator are from different parties, we
will call this a divided government. Our empirical results suggest that an extra
opposition legislator has the most impact on politicians behavior when this
extra legislator exogenously flips the control of the local city council. Hence,
our analysis here will compare equilibrium level of corruption and oversight
when the game begins with an unified government versus when it begins with
a divided government.
All agents want to maximize the discounted sum of their utilities:
Ui = ui1 + δui2 (1.4.1)
The voter has to elect a mayor and a legislator in the second period. The
utility of the voter is uv = θ − C if he elects a mayor and a legislator from the
same party (unified government) or uv = θ−C −D if he elects a mayor and a
legislator from different parties (divided government). θ is a random shock with
a uniform [0,1] distribution, C is how much the elected mayor decided to steal
and D is a loss of utility from having a divided government. D captures the
idea that if the voter did not worry about corruption he would always choose
24This maps directly to the fact that mayors can only serve two consecutive terms in Brazil.
25ma and la or mb and lb
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one of the parties to control both branches of government to avoid gridlock or
any other negative consequence from divided government. Voters don’t observe
θ.
There are two types of mayoral candidates: corrupt (c) and non-corrupt
(nc). The probability of a mayor from party a being corrupt is p and from
party b being corrupt is p′, with p < p′ and 2p
p+1
< p′. Corrupt mayors have
a utility ucm = E + C − B if elected and zero otherwise. Non-corrupt mayors
have utility uncm = E if elected and zero otherwise. E is a ego rent politicians
enjoy if elected; C ∈ {0, c̄}, with c̄ < 1 ,is how much corruption rent the elected
mayor extracts and B ∈ [0, C] is how much the elected mayor gives to the
legislature as bribe. Hence, by the very definition of his utility, a non-corrupt
mayor does not extract rents.
Finally, the utility of legislators is ul = V +B if elected and zero otherwise.
V is an ego rent legislators enjoy if elected and B is how much bribe they
accepted from the mayor.
The timing of the game is as follows. Nature draws the type of the in-
cumbent (Ma), the type of the challenger (Mb) and θ. The incumbent mayor
observes θ and chooses the pair (Bo, C), where Bo is the bribe offer to the leg-
islator. The elected legislator observes (Bo, C), if C > 0 he can report C to
the voter26 or take no action. If he reports the mayor, he cannot accept the
bribe and B = 0, if he does not report the mayor, he accepts the bribe and
B = Bo. If C = 0 the legislator has no action to take. Voters observe their
utility and whether the mayor’s actions were reported and decide whether to
reelect the mayor and/or the legislator. Finally, in the second period, nature
draws θ again, the elected mayor chooses a new pair (Bo, C) and the elected
legislator decides to report corruption activities or not.
We start solving the game with the last period. Because it is the last
period, a legislator will accept any bribe Bo > 0 and will be indifferent between
26This reporting is based on hard evidence, he cannot lie about C.
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reporting the executive or not if Bo = 0. If a mayor is corrupt, he will make
Bo = 0 and C = c̄ ∀θ because there are no reelection incentives. Since a corrupt
mayor will always steal in a divided or unified government in the second period,
the voter always elect a unified government in the second period to avoid paying
the cost D. But voters still have to decide if they will elect a unified government
under party a or b in the second period. This decision boils down to the voter’s
belief about the probability of the first period mayor been a corrupt type given
the utility or reports he gets. Hence, if P (c/u, r) < p′, he reelects the mayor,
otherwise, he does not. Therefore mayors of a corrupt type might want to
behave as non-corrupt mayors in the first period to get reelected and enjoy ego
and corruption rents in the second period.
The incentives of legislators to accept a bribe or report a mayor in the
first period depends if it is allied with the mayor or not. Since,under a unified
government, the reelection of the legislator is completely tied to the reelection of
the mayor, he will never reveal any wrongdoings of the mayor because this would
get the mayor kicked out of office along with him. On the other hand, under
a divided government, the reelection of the legislator is tied to the incumbent
mayor been kicked out of office. Hence, he will reveal any wrongdoing of the
mayor unless the bribe offered by the mayor is high enough so that he is willing
to forgo his reelection.
To solve the first period of the game, we will need to break it down in two
cases depending on how much a corrupt mayor values getting reelected and
staying in office versus and how much they value extracting rents today but
getting kicked out of office. We will focus on cases where c̄ < δV in all sub
cases below.27.
27Otherwise, legislators are cheap to bribe and the equilibrium will involve corrupt may-
ors’ bribing legislators to get away with corruption. For this parameter values, there is no
difference in equilibrium corruption, oversight and reelection probability between a divided
or unified goverment.
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Case 1: c̄ >
E
1− δ
Under a Unified Government in period 1
As in all cases under a unified government, the legislator will never be better
off reporting the mayor because by doing so the voter will know that the mayor
is a corrupt type and will not reelect any of the branches, hence, Bo = B = 0
and the legislative never reports.
In this specific case, the rents a corrupt mayor can extract today are too
large compared with what he can get tomorrow. Hence, he makes C = c̄ ∀θ.
Voters reelect the mayor if Uv1 > 0 and do not reelect the mayor if Uv1 6 0.
Voter beliefs are P (c/uv1) = 1 if uv1 < 0 , P (c/uv1) = p if 1− c̄ > uv1 > 0 and
P (c/uv1) = 0 if 1− c̄ < uv1.
Under a Divided Government in period 1
As in all cases under a divided government, the legislator will accept the
bribe and won’t report the mayor if Bo ≥ δV and will report the mayor other-
wise.
In this specific case, the rents a corrupt mayor can extract today are too
large compared with what he can get tomorrow and the legislator is too expen-
sive to buy off. Hence, he makes C = c̄ and Bo = 0 ∀θ. Legislators will always
report the mayor and he will not be reelected.
Case 2: c̄ <
E
1− δ
Under a Unified Government in period 1
22
As we argued before under a unified government, the legislator will never
be better off reporting the mayor. Hence, Bo = B = 0 and the legislative never
reports.
In this specific case, the rents a corrupt mayor can extract tomorrow are
enough to prevent him from stealing if he knows he will get caught. Hence,
he makes C = c̄ for θ > c̄ and C = 0 for θ < c̄. Voters always reelect the
mayor. Voter beliefs are P (c/uv1) =
2p
p+1
28 if c̄ > uv1 > 0 , P (c/uv1) = p if
1− c̄ > uv1 > c̄ and P (c/uv1) = 0 if 1− c̄ < uv1.
Under a Divided Government in period 1
As we argued before under a divided government, the legislator will accept
the bribe and won’t report the mayor if Bo ≥ δV and will report the mayor
otherwise.
In this specific case, the rents a corrupt mayor can extract tomorrow are
enough to prevent him from stealing if he knows he will get caught. Also, the
legislator is too expensive to be bought off. Hence, he makes C = 0 and Bo = 0
∀θ. Legislators won’t have anything to report and the mayor will always get
reelected.
Result 1 : Expected corruption C under a unified government is greater





E(C) = p(1 − c̄))c̄ in unified government and E(C) = 0 under a divided







E(C) = pc̄ in unified government and in a divided government
Result 2 : The probability of the legislator reporting the mayor P (Report)
under a unified government is smaller than or equal to the probability of re-










P (Report) = 0 in unified government and P (Report) = p under a divided
government
Result 3 : The probability of the mayor getting reelected P (Reelected)
under a divided government is greater than or equal to the probablity of reelec-











P (Reelected) = p(1− c̄) + 1− p in unified government and P (Reelected) =
1− p under a divided government
This simple model generates these 3 predictions that we can take to the
data. According to our model, municipalities with a first-term mayor and more
opposition legislators in the city council are (1) more likely to have investi-
gations launched into the mayor’s actions, (2) less likely to have corruption
episodes, and (3) less likely to reelect the incumbent mayor.
1.5 Econometric Model
1.5.1 Constructing the Running Variable
In order to identify causal effects we use a regression discontinuity (RD) model
which exploits close elections.29 As a key part of our RD model we construct
a running variable that serves as a measure for how close a given election was.
We use detailed knowledge of Brazil’s electoral system in order to construct
this running variable. Brazil has an open party-list proportional system, with
seats allocated according to the D’Hondt Method and with coalitions treated as
single parties. In order to illustrate how the D’Hondt Method works, consider
the following example.
Imagine three different coalitions are competing for 6 seats in a fictional city
council. The coalition of parties A & B receives 100,000 votes, the coalition
of parties C & D receives 80,000 votes, and party E, which is running as an
isolated party, receives 20,000 votes. First, the ‘electoral quotient’ is calculated,
which is the total amount of votes cast divided by the number of seats available.
In our case, the electoral quotient is (100, 000 + 80, 000 + 20, 000)/6 = 33, 333.
29For identification of causal effects using the RD design see Hahn, Todd, and Van der
Klaauw (2001). For a primer on RD see Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
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Only coalitions whose raw vote count exceeds the electoral quotient are eligible
to be awarded seats. Thus, party E is already disqualified from winning seats,
since it only received 20,000 votes. After this, a series of quotients is calculated




where V is the total of votes the coalition received and s is the round of
calculation (or number of seats already awarded to the coalition). In an election
where n seats are available, coalitions are awarded 1 seat for each quotient they
have among the highest n quotients.
This is illustrated in the table below, where the coalition of A & B and the
coalition of C & D have both been awarded 3 seats, since both have 3 quotients
among the top 6 quotients.
D’Hondt Method Example (6 seats available)
Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Seats Won
Parties A+B 100, 000∗ 50, 000∗ 33, 333∗ 25,000 20,000 3
Parties C+D 80, 000∗ 40, 000∗ 26, 666∗ 20,000 16,000 3
Party E 20,000 10,000 6,666 5,000 4,000 0
Note: Asterisks denote quotients in the top 6. Each quotient a coalition has
in the top 6 of quotients earns them a seat.
Because of the proportional representation system, only the last seat filled
in each municipality (city) can be considered as being ‘on the margin’ of being
flipped from one coalition to another. In the example above, that is the seat
awarded to the coalition of parties C & D for their quotient of 26,666 (which
was the lowest quotient of the top 6). In this case, the coalition of parties A
& B was also on the margin of winning this seat, because of their quotient of
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25,000 (which was the highest quotient not in the top 6).30 We consider these
two quotients (26,666 and 25,000) as the ‘marginal quotients’.
We construct the running variable for our sharp RD design as the opposition
coalition’s margin of victory (or loss) between quotients for the last seat filled
in the legislature, scaled by the total amount of votes cast. Thus, for each





whereQm,opposition is the marginal quotient of the opposition coalition, Qm,mayor−coalition
is the marginal quotient of the mayor’s coalition, and TotalV otesm is the to-
tal amount of votes cast for city councillors in the election. In the example
above, if the coalition of parties A & B was allied with the mayor, and the
coalition of parties C & D was the opposition, the running variable would then




Notice that in the example above the opposition is capturing its 3rd seat
in the city council, but in our dataset the marginal opposition quotient can
correspond to the opposition capturing any seat (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and so on).
Because our dataset is not large enough to precisely estimate the treatment ef-
fect at each individual threshold (the effect of the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd seat occupied
by an opposing city councillor), we stack all of the thresholds and our estimated
treatment effect is a weighted average of the treatment effect at various seats
(as discussed in Cattaneo et al., 2016) rather than the treatment effect at a
single seat.
In practice, there are often 3 or more coalitions in the legislative election,
rather than just a pro-mayor and an opposition coalition. We make the sim-
plifying assumption that parties that are not formally allied with the mayor in
30Note that parties A & B didn’t miss winning that seat by 1,666 votes, they actually
missed it by 4*1,666=6664 votes, since the total votes was scaled down for purposes of the
quotient.
27
the election coalitions are against him or her, and are considered the political
opposition.31
We drop observations from the analysis if they meet any of the following
criteria32. :
• The two marginal quotients are from the same coalition, and thus the
concept of ‘being on the margin’ is no longer valid. This happens when
the marginal seat is passing from one opposition coalition to another, or
from one pro-mayor coalition to another. (25% of obs)
• The quotients we calculate from vote totals do not acurately predict the
amount of seats awarded to each party. This is may happen due to a gap
in coalition data. (1.5% of obs)
• Coalitions are such that two parties are allied in the election for city
councilors but not in the election for mayor. (1.5% of obs)
Figure 1.1 shows the variation that this identification strategy in generating.
On average, on the left side of the discontinuity the opposition represents 45%
of the local city council, whereas on the on the right side of the discontinuity it
represents 55%. Notice that beyond just increasing the opposition share in the
city council, on average our variation also flips the opposition from minority to
majority on the city council.
Note that it is hard to interpret the correlation between our running vari-
able and outcomes of interest outside the cutoff. As Figure 1.1 makes clear,
31This identification strategy bears some resemblance to that of Folke (2014), though our
strategy is simpler as we estimate only the effects of opposition in general, not the effects of
specific parties.
32In table 3.3 as well as table 1.13 (in the appendix, section 1.9.1), we compare election
and municipal characteristics of the RD sample and the non-RD sample. As can be seen,
municipalities in the RD sample have slightly fewer coalitions overall. This is expected given
that when there are fewer coalitions it is more likely that the marginal seat is passing from
a pro-mayor party to an anti-mayor party, or vice-versa (if there are only 2 coalitions, then
a seat can only pass from a pro-mayor coalition to an anti-mayor coalition, but if there are
4 coalitions, 2 for the mayor and 2 against, then the marginal seat may pass from one pro-
mayor coalition to another pro-mayor coalition, invalidating the RD), but in general dropped
municipalities are qualitatively similar to municipalities in the RD sample.
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higher values of the running variable are not necessarily associated with a larger
presence of opposition in the local city council. This happens because our run-
ning variable is stacked across all seat thresholds rather than at a single seat
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Figure 1.1: Share of Opposition in the City Council
Notes: Here we present the RD plot for the opposition seat share in the local city council.
This plot presents equally sized bins with means of the dependent variable inside each one.
It also presents the prediction for the dependent variable from a regression of the dependent
variable on the running variable and on the running variable squared and plots the resulting
line along with a 95% confidence interval.
1.5.2 Effect on Corruption
With this running variable we estimate a series of sharp RD models. The first
model, which estimates the effect of political opposition on various measures of
corruption, can be written
cm,t = α1 + α2Tm,t + α3f(Rm,t) + α4f(Rm,t) ∗ Tm,t + εm,t (1.5.1)
for municipality m during term t.33 Where cm,t is the amount of corrupt viola-
tions found in the municipality, the function f(∗) is a polynomial specification
33A small number of municipalities were audited twice in the same term. In this case we
only consider the first audit report.
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for the running variable, and Tm,t = I[Rm,t > 0] denotes treatment status.
Thus, α2 is the main parameter of interest. For each outcome, we report in sec-
tion 3.5 our preferred specification in tables (using the CCT optimal bandwidth
from Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) and a quadratic polynomial spec-
ification), and in section 1.10.1 in the appendix as a robustness check, we report
a number of alternate RD specifications, varying the bandwidth and polyno-
mial order. In the appendix we also report CCT’s bias-corrected and robust
variance estimates from Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).
1.5.3 Effect on Public Service Provision
The second model estimates the effect of political opposition on the quality of
public service provision. This model differs from the first model in that we now
observe data at the individual level rather than the municipality level, also it is
done as a linear probability model34, since survey answers are yes/no answers.
The model can be written
psi,m,t = β1 + β2Ti,m,t + β3f(Ri,m,t) + β4f(Ri,m,t) ∗ Ti,m,t + εi,m,t (1.5.2)
for individual i in municipalitym during term t. Where psi,m,t is an indicator
for the respondent answering ‘yes’ to a given question relating to public service
provision, and now β2 is the main parameter of interest. In this model standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. Once again, we report in tables
our preferred specification and the appendix contains a variety of robustness
checks.
It should be noted that this model does not limit the channel through which
political opposition may affect public service provision. Given the nature of our
identification strategy, we cannot distinguish between an improvement in public
services and health outcomes that is due to the reduction in corruption that
34Results are the same for probit/logit models.
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we see, versus an improvement that is a direct result of increased opposition.
For example, increased opposition might directly induce higher mayor effort
in the provision of public goods, independent of whether or not it reduces
corruption. However, it is clear from the results presented in this paper that
political opposition improves politician performance.
1.5.4 Effect on Health Outcomes
The third model estimates the effect of the marginal politicaly opposed legisla-
tor on various health outcomes. In this model we again observe municipalities,
though this model differs from the first model in that now we observe data for
each year within an electoral term. The model can be written
hy,m,t = γ1 + γ2Ty,m,t + γ3f(Ry,m,t) + γ4f(Ry,m,t) ∗ Ty,m,t + uy,m,t (1.5.3)
for municipality m in year y during term t. Where hy,m,t is a health outcome
measure and now γ2 is the main parameter of interest. In this model standard
errors are also clustered at the municipality level. For each of these models,
tables 1.5 through 1.8 contain our preferred specification and the appendix
section 1.10.1 contains alternate specifications to test robustness.
1.5.5 RD Design: Smoothness and Balance Tests
The key assumption for RD to be valid is the smoothness or ‘no precise ma-
nipulation’ assumption. We test for manipulation of the running variable using
the test outlined in McCrary (2008) and using the local polynomial methods
put forth in Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2017). We find no evidence of manip-
ulation, failing to reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation with a p-value
of 0.97. Figure 3.2 presents visual evidence of this.
As additional evidence for the validity of the RD design, in tables 1.28 to
1.30 in the appendix, we present results from placebo tests for each of the 3
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models we present above, estimating the effect of treatment on a variety of
municipal characteristics where no treatment should be found. Our results
show a broad covariate balance across the 32 variables we test.
Figure 1.2: Density of the running variable (margin of victory/loss for the
marginal legislator politically opposed to the mayor). Using McCrary’s (2006)
density test, we find no evidence of manipulation of the running variable.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Effects on Legislative Oversight
We first show results for the most immediate outcomes: whether the president
of the city council belongs to the opposition and whether a CPI investigation
was opened by the city council. For the control of the city council (whether or
not the city council president is a member of the mayor’s coalition), we use the
RD model outlined above and find that flipping one city council member from
pro-mayor to anti-mayor increases the likelihood that the city council will be
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controlled by an opposition legislator by 14 percentage points, amounting to a
43% change in probability. This is unsurprising given that most city councils
have 9 seats, and thus, treatment entails an 11.11 percentage point change in
composition. Figure 1.3 presents the corresponding RD plot35.
Next we examine the effect that the marginal opposition legislator has on
the probability that the mayor will be investigated for wrongdoing using a CPI.
As outlined in section 1.3.4, in order to limit the scope of our data collection,
we use the algorithm outlined by Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik (2015) in
order to find the bandwidth around which treatment can be considered random,
and then we regress treatment on CPI opening for only this bandwidth. Here
we find that the marginal opposition legislator increases the likelihood of a CPI
investigation by about 6 percentage points, amounting to a 55% increase in the
likelihood of an investigation.
Table 1.4: Effect of Opposition on Council Functioning





Effect of the marginal opposing legislator. S.E. in parenthesis.
For ‘Opposition Countil President’, we use the RD estimator and the
mean reported is the overall mean. For ‘CPI Opened’, we use the
randomization algorithm outlined in Cattaneo, Frandsen, and
Titiunik (2015), and the mean reported is the control mean.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
35As a matter of consistency, we use a 0.02 bandwidth in all RD plots presented. But it is
important to note that the bandwidth used in the estimation tables vary for each dependent
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Figure 1.3: Council Leader Belongs to Opposition
Notes: Here we present the RD plot of the probability that the city council president
is a member of the opposition’s coalition. This plot presents equally sized bins with means
of the dependent variable inside each one. It also presents the prediction for the dependent
variable from a regression of the dependent variable on the running variable and on the
running variable squared and plots the resulting line along with a 95% confidence interval.
For consistency, we use a 0.02 bandwidth for all RD plots, which is generally wider than the
CCT optimal bandwidth used for coefficient estimates.
1.6.2 Effect on Corruption
Our estimates for the treatment effect in equation 2.3.1 are reported in table
1.5. Here we see that when the mayor faces reelection incentives (first term
mayors), the marginal politically opposed legislator can decrease the amount
of items audited found to have corruption by approximately 1.353 items, which
amounts to a 0.846 decrease in standard deviation units36. Figure 1.4 presents
the corresponding RD plot. This effect is driven largely by embezzlement,
which is decreased by 0.889 items. This is a sizable effect given that the av-
erage municipality only has 1.6 items audited found to be involved in some
36We find no effects for mayors without reelection incentives (second term mayors). While
our theoretical model considers only electoral costs to corruption, there are also potentially
criminal costs of corruption. The fact that we find no effect for second term mayors suggests
that information discovered and revealed by the city council is politically damaging rather
than criminally damaging, or perhaps that malfeasant actions are observable by the legislature
(may be used for political purposes), but not verifiable (prosecutable).
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type of corruption.37 Note that there is no significant effect on ‘Other Irregu-
larities’, evidence that our embezzlement variable is indeed measuring cases of
embezzlement and not mere procedural errors.
Compared to the effect on embezzlement, the effects on fraud and overin-
voicing are small, in addition to being statistically insignificant. Going back
to the discussion in section 3.2, this is evidence that the legislative branch can
restrain the executive branch’s rent-seeking through its auditing responsibili-
ties, but not through its lawmaking responsibilities. Restraining the executive
from transferring money from government bank accounts to his or her own pri-
vate bank account is fairly straightforward as long as the city council requires
that the mayor and his secretaries provide receipts and other documentation
for all expenditures they make. However, knowing which public projects pro-
posed by the mayor are likely to be fraudulent may be more difficult. These
findings also run contrary to the idea that corruption in Brazil is completely
institutionalized, independent of party affiliation.
These results are robust to a variety of alternate specifications as shown in
the appendix in section 1.10.1.
37For municipalities where corruption was found, the average is 2.8 items found to be
involved with some type of corruption.
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Table 1.5: Corruption Outcomes, First Term Mayors
Total Corruption Embezzlement Fraud Overinvoicing Other Irreg.
T -1.353∗∗ -0.889∗∗∗ -0.329 -0.270 0.443
(0.578) (0.296) (0.309) (0.279) (1.065)
Optimal BW 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009
Obsevations 244 260 294 329 352
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on corruption, using the CCT optimal
bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Standard errors in parenthesis. Outcomes are the count
of items audited with a violation. Other irregularities captures all other irregularities
found by auditors that were not classified as embezzlement, fraud, or overinvoicing,
and includes a host of procedural and other errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Next, we briefly examine the effect of political opposition on corruption by
government sector. In our audit data the largest 3 sectors in terms of irregular-
ities are the ministries of Health, Education, and Social Development, together
making up 85% of the irregularities discovered by auditors, with various other
ministries making up the remainder. For this analysis we again estimate the
model from equation 2.3.1, but using the total corruption variable differentiated
for these 3 different sectors of the government. In table 1.6 we find that effect of
political opposition on corruption is largely concentrated in the health sector,
with some evidence of effects in the education sector. This motivates the next
section of our analysis, in which we estimate the effect of political opposition
on healthcare provision and health outcomes.38
38We also examined possible effects on education outcomes, which sector is statistically
significant at the 10% level in table 1.6, but we found no clear effects.
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Table 1.6: Total Corruption by Government Sector, First Term Mayors
Ministry of Health Ministry of Education Ministry of Social Dev.
T -0.907∗∗∗ -0.470∗ 0.0259
(0.314) (0.273) (0.103)
Optimal BW .007 .008 .009
Observations 260 297 307
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on total corruption, estimated by government
sector. We use the CCT optimal bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Outcomes are the count of items audited with a violation for each sector.
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Figure 1.4: Total Corruption
Notes: Here we present the RD plot of the amount of items audited found to have
corruption. This plot presents equally sized bins with means of the dependent variable inside
each one. It also presents the prediction for the dependent variable from a regression of
the dependent variable on the running variable and on the running variable squared and
plots the resulting line along with a 95% confidence interval. For consistency, we use a 0.02
bandwidth for all RD plots, which is generally wider than the CCT optimal bandwidth used
for coefficient estimates.
1.6.3 Effect on Healthcare Provision
If the marginal politically opposed city councillor can decrease the amount of
healthcare money embezzled by the executive branch, we may hope that the
money not being stolen is finding its way to the programs it is meant for.
Complementary to this, there may be some direct effect of higher politician
effort on public service provision. Thus, we now examine the pass-through
37
effects on public service provision, particularly healthcare. In Brazil a large
amount of healthcare is provided by the government, with local government
health clinics staffed by physicians, dentists, and nurses. If money is being
stolen from public coffers, local governments will be cash-constrained and may
be unable to hire the adequate amount of healthcare professionals, or unable to
pay the professionals they have already hired. Approximately 51% of physicians
in Brazil work in both the public and private sectors.39 If these physicians are
unpaid for their public work because of missing funds, they will likely substitute
towards their private practice, leaving the public clinics understaffed and unable
to provide care to those who depend on Brazil’s public healthcare. Additionally,
it may be that mayors with more opposition in the city council exert higher
effort in assuring that health clinics are adequately staffed40. We examine this
effect on public service provision in table 1.7, which contains our estimates
for the treatment effect from equation 2.3.2. Because of our small amount of
clusters in the healthcare provision data, in this table we pool first and second
term mayors together.
Estimates in panel A of table 1.7 suggest that flipping a city counselor from
being allied with the mayor to being opposed to the mayor results in a 34 p.p.
increase in the likelihood a dentist will be present to see patients, and a 28
p.p increase in the likelihood that a physician will be present to see patients.
Figure 1.5 presents the corresponding RD plots.
Results in panel B show that political opposition also improves public ser-
vices by decreasing the likelihood that patients will have to wait in lines to
39Meanwhile 27% work exclusively in private medicine and 22% work only in public
medicine (Scheffer M. et al. 2015).
40In fact, in collecting the CPI data, we found multiple investigations opened specifically








recieve care at local health units (resulting in a 40 p.p decrease in probability),
and decreasing the likelihood that the municipal government uses irregular
hiring practices for healthcare professionals (while the coefficient is not inter-
pretable due to the steep slope of the regression function, it is clear that there
is a large effect).
In recent years, Brazil has experienced a significant shortage of physicians at
public health clinics. There are various news articles documenting this (Falcão
and Amorim; ‘Postos de saúde’) and the Brazilian Federal government has
responded with an ongoing federal program which started in 2013, Mais Médicos
(More Doctors), which is aimed at recruiting more physicians for public health
clinics, including importing them from other countries. Experts cited in these
news articles suggest that this public sector shortage of physicians could be
due to under financing of the public health system. Our results suggest that a
significant share of the physician shortage in the public sector could explained
by missing funds due to corruption, and that much of this corruption could be
stopped by legislators who will fulfill their oversight responsibilities.
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Table 1.7: Public Service Provision, First and Second Term Mayors
Panel A: Presence of Healthcare Professionals
Nurse Present Dentist Present Physician Present
T 0.150 0.339∗∗ 0.277∗∗
(0.128) (0.139) (0.128)
Optimal BW 0.008 0.008 0.009
Observations 2711 2233 2751
Clusters 127 121 130
Panel B: Community Health Agents and Lines
Irregular Hiring Lines at Health Unit Healthcare Visits
T -1.055∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗ -0.0369
(0.256) (0.170) (0.0487)
Optimal BW 0.007 0.007 0.006
Observations 243 2439 2482
Clusters 74 119 117
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on public service provision outcomes,
using the CCT optimal bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Clustered standard errors in
parenthesis.
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Figure 1.5: Effect on Healthcare Provision
Notes: Here we present the RD plots for particular outcomes of interest. These plots
present equally sized bins with means of the dependent variable inside each one. They also
present the prediction for the dependent variable from a regression of the dependent variable
on the running variable and on the running variable squared and plots the resulting line along
with a 95% confidence interval. For consistency, we use a 0.02 bandwidth for all RD plots,
which is generally wider than the CCT optimal bandwidth used for coefficient estimates.
1.6.4 Effect on Health Outcomes
Going further down the causal chain, we now estimate the effect that the
marginal opposing legislator has on actual health outcomes, particularly in-
fant health. If physicians are missing from local health clinics due to missing
funds or low politician effort, it is natural to expect to see negative health out-
comes for the population these clinics serve. Alves and Timmins (2003) show
that poorer (uneducated) Brazilians are those who are most likely to use the
public health system, whereas wealthier Brazilians generally seek care from pri-
vate providers. Thus, we expect to see some effect on health outcomes for the
uneducated, especially for infants, who are among the most vulnerable.41 Table
41It is also relevant to note that many researchers use infant mortality rate as a proxy
measure for the overall health of a population.
41
1.8 contains our estimates for the treatment effect from equation 2.3.3. Figure
1.6 presents the corresponding RD plots.
The most interesting finding from this section is that in panel A of table 1.8
we see that in municipalities where the mayor faces reelection incentives, the
marginal opposing legislator can improve executive performance to the extent
that on average it lowers the infant mortality rate by 3.4 deaths per 1000 live
births for uneducated mothers. This estimate is robust to a whole range of
specifications as shown in figure 1.22 in section 1.10.1 in the appendix. Given
that the overall infant mortality rate in Brazil is approximately 15 per 1000 live
births, this is a large effect for only a single city councillor to have.
The coefficient on the rate of preterm births is also significant at the 10%
level, preterm birth being a leading cause of child deaths (Preterm Birth 2016)42.
This estimate is also robust to different specifications as shown in figure 1.21 in
section 1.10.1 in the appendix. As predicted, no effect is found on infant health
outcomes for educated mothers.
42We find no effects on infant mortality or preterm births for mayors without reelection
incentives (second term mayors).
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Table 1.8: Public Health Outcomes, First Term Mayors
Panel A: Uneducated Mothers
Preterm Infant Mort. Rate
T -0.824∗ -3.402∗∗∗
(0.431) (1.254)
Optimal BW 0.009 0.010
Observations 17297 19819
Clusters 3580 3945
Panel B: Educated Mothers
Preterm Infant Mort. Rate
T -0.377 -0.228
(0.304) (0.765)
Optimal BW 0.009 0.007
Observations 18645 15136
Clusters 3772 3238
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on public health outcomes, using the
CCT optimal bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
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Figure 1.6: Effect on Health Outcomes
Notes: Here we present the RD plots for particular outcomes of interest. These plots
present equally sized bins with means of the dependent variable inside each one. They also
present the prediction for the dependent variable from a regression of the dependent variable
on the running variable and on the running variable squared and plots the resulting line along
with a 95% confidence interval. For consistency, we use a 0.02 bandwidth for all RD plots,
which is generally wider than the CCT optimal bandwidth used for coefficient estimates.
Leveraging the fact that the health outcomes above are in panel format (we
observe the same municipality for different year), we can perform a placebo
test for our estimated effects on health outcomes. We reestimate the previous
RD results using health outcomes during the previous mayoral term as the
dependent variable. If our identification strategy is valid, then having an extra
opposition legislator in term t should have no effect on health outcomes in
that municipality in term t − 1. Figure 1.7 shows the graphical results of this
exercise. Unlike Figure 1.6, Figure 1.7 shows no differences in health outcomes
around the discontinuity whatsoever, strongly suggesting that our results are
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Figure 1.7: Placebo: Effect on Lagged Health Outcomes
Notes: The plots show the estimated treatment effect with 95% confidence intervals for
each marginal seat the can be captured by the opposition for different dependent variables.
1.6.5 Heterogeneous Effects by Seat
With the main effects established, we now examine heterogeneity of the treat-
ment effect depending on what marginal seat the the opposition is capturing.
As we discussed in Section 5, our previous models stack all of the seat thresh-
olds and our estimated treatment effect is a weighted average of the treatment
effect at all seats.
However, it is possible that the effects of an extra opposition legislator are
strongest when this legislator changes which coalition has a majority in the
city council (going from 4 to 5 seats in a 9-seat council, for example), giving
the opposition real power in the legislative branch to open an investigation of
the mayor, choose who investigates and how, and block corrupt legislation. It
is also possible that these effects have little to do with specific institutional
features that only a majority can use. For example, maybe more opposition
legislators simply means more oversight capacity because there are more people
to share the work. In this case, it should not matter which seat the opposition
is capturing43, i.e., no heterogeneous effect by seat.
For this section we focus our analysis on municipalities whose city council
has only 9 seats, which makes up 90% of councils in our sample. In table 1.9
43In this framework, if there are decreasing marginal returns for opposition legislators, you
could also imagine the effect been strongest for the first seat captured by the opposition.
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we compare the treatment effect of the opposition winning its 5th seat with the
effect for all other seats pooled together.44 We find broad evidence that the
marginal opposing legislator affects the mayor’s performance mainly when it
flips the majority in the city council. All estimated coefficients point to a much
larger effect for the 5th seat. This result suggests that to promote effective
oversight, the opposition needs to have access to institutional features that are
only available once they have a majority in the legislative branch.
Table 1.9: Opposition Effects: Flipping the Majority vs Not Flipping the Ma-
jority
Panel A: Marginal Opposition Legislator Flips Majority
CPI Council Leader Corruption Infant Mort. Preterm Reel.
T 0.0949 0.526∗∗∗ -1.218 -5.018∗∗ -1.999∗ -0.151∗∗
(0.0909) (0.115) (1.179) (2.379) (1.021) (0.0742)
Observations 115 542 45 2868 3712 721
Panel B: Marginal Opposition Legislator does not Flip Majority
CPI Council Leader Corruption Infant Mort. Preterm Reel.
T 0.0148 0.00368 -0.656 -1.956 -0.711 -0.00544
(0.0797) (0.0590) (0.633) (1.471) (0.672) (0.0395)
Observations 211 1958 147 8782 8911 2401
Standard errors in parentheses. Treatment indicates the effect of switching one seat in the
legislature from ‘pro-mayor’ to ‘anti-mayor’. Panel A contains estimates for such occasions
when this switch flips the mayor’s coalition from having a majority to having a minorty, and
panel B contains estimates for all other occasions. ‘Reel.’ refers to reelection of the mayor.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
44We also do the analysis seat-by-seat in the appendix in Figure 1.12, but we do not report
the results here because estimates are highly imprecise. Nevertheless, the general pattern of




Finally, we test two of the main mechanisms of the model. First, revealing a
mayor is corrupt reduces the reelection chances of allied legislators. To test
this we use the same identification strategy of Ferraz and Finan (2008). They
explore the fact that the timing of the public dissemination of the federal audit
results is random. Some municipalities had the results of the audit reported
before the municipal elections and some municipalities had the results published
after the election took place. They use this variation to estimate the effect of
exposing a corrupt mayor on their reelection chances. We use the same strategy,
but we estimate the effect of exposing the mayor on the 2008 reelection chances
of legislators that belonged to the mayor’s coalition.
Also motivated by Ferraz and Finan (2008), we examine the interaction of
audits with the presence of AM radio stations which disseminate knowledge
about the results of the audits, and our indicator for corrupt indicates when 2
or more items were found to have corruption, since Ferraz and Finan’s findings
suggest that voters tolerate low levels of corruption, but not high levels.
The two specifications we use are these:
yi =β0 + β1PreAuditi + β2Corrupti + β3PreAuditiXCorrupti +Xi + εi
yi =β0 + β1PreAuditi + β2Corrupti + β3AMRadioi + β4PreAuditiXCorrupti
+ β5AMRadioiXCorrupti + β6PreAuditiXAMRadioi + β7PreAuditiXAMRadioXCorrupti
+Xi + εi
where Xi is a vector of municipal charactaristics.
In table 1.10 we find that when the mayor is revealed to be corrupt and there
is a local AM radio station present to disseminate the audit report results, this
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lowers reelection probability for mayor-allied legislators by about 10 percentage
points.45 This result shows that beyond punishing corrupt mayors (Ferraz and
Finan, 2008), voters also punish legislators that are allied with corrupt mayors.
Thus, city counselors that are allied with the mayor lack incentives to report and
investigate corruption, because revealing this corruption would likely damage
their own political careers.
Table 1.10: The effect of revealing that the mayor is corrupt











The outcome for both columns is an indicator for if a mayor-allied member of the
city council is reelected.
Standard errors in parentheses, municipal charactaristics used as controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Finally, we also test if the presence of opposition legislators reduces the re-
election chances of incumbent mayors using reelection results for the 2008, 2012
and 2016 mayoral elections. According to our political agency model, opposing
45This is β4 + β7
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legislators will reduce reelection chances of mayors when reelection incentives
are not strong enough to force corrupt mayors to pretend to be non-corrupt,
even when they know that they will be reported by legislators and this will
end up costing their reelection. Table 1.11 shows that an additional opposition
legislator decreases mayors’ reelection chances by 6.2 p.p. If we estimate the
effect of an additional opposition legislator in municipalities where the incum-
bent mayor actually ran for office, there is a reduction of 9.2 p.p. on reelection
chances. These results are robust to a variety of alternate specifications as
shown in the appendix in section 1.10.1.
Table 1.11: Incumbent Mayor Reelection
Reelection Reel. Conditional on Running Incumbent Vote Share
T -0.0618∗ -0.0926∗∗ -0.0215
(0.0360) (0.0433) (0.0163)
Optimal Bandwidth 0.011 0.010 0.010
Observations 5539 3985 3800
Effect of the marginal opposing legislator. CCT optimal bandwidth, uniform kernel, s.e. in parenthesis.
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Figure 1.8: Probability of Mayor Reelection
Notes: Here we present the RD plot of the probability of the incumbent mayor getting
reelected. This plot presents equally sized bins with means of the dependent variable inside
each one. It also presents the prediction for the dependent variable from a regression of
the dependent variable on the running variable and on the running variable squared and
plots the resulting line along with a 95% confidence interval. For consistency, we use a 0.02
bandwidth for all RD plots, which is generally wider than the CCT optimal bandwidth used
for coefficient estimates.
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Our estimates of the sizable effect of political opposition on corruption, public
service delivery, and health outcomes, coupled with the fact that the typical
mayor has 5 city councillors in his or her coalition (table 1.18) suggests that
mayors depend significantly on having city councillors on their side in order to
extract rents or exert low effort.
It is useful to benchmark the magnitudes of our estimated impacts on cor-
ruption with previous results in the literature. For example, Ferraz and Finan
(2011) find that reelection incentives are associated with a 0.471 reduction in
acts of corruption in Brazil and Bobonis et al (2016) find that announcing a
municipality will be audited before an election reduces the number of reported
corrupt violations in 1.43 in Puerto Rico. Hence, our results suggest that the
increase in political opposition have an impact similar to the threat of audits.
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It is also important to put these large impacts on infant mortality rate in a
broader context. During our period of study infant mortality in Brazil was in
fast decline (see Figure 1.11). Hence, it might be useful to benchmark our re-
sults with this broader trend and think of the impact of opposition legislators as
an acceleration of this improvement process. Back of the envelope calculations
show that our impact is equivalent to a 3 years acceleration in the improvement
of infant mortality outcomes.46 Finally, the magnitude of our estimated impact
is also similar to the findings of Galiani et al (2005) that the privatization of
water provision in Argentina reduced in a short period of time child mortality
by up to 26 percent in poor areas.
This suggests that it may be favorable to have more legislators politically
opposed to the mayor, but legislators are chosen by voters, not economists, so
what can be done? It so happens that the D’Hondt Method used in Brazil (and
many other countries) to apportion seats is known to disproportionately favor
parties that are politically stronger. As can be seen in table 1.20, the typical
mayor’s coalition in Brazil is the largest coalition in terms of vote share. Thus,
using an alternative method that does not disproportionately favor stronger
parties may be a low-cost way to increase political opposition, decrease corrup-
tion, and improve public service provision.
We conduct counterfactual simulations using the Webster Method, the Dan-
ish Method, and the Huntington-Hill Method on Brazil’s municipal electoral
data from 2004 to 2016, and report results in tables 1.32 through 1.34 in ap-
pendix 1.10.4. The three methods only differ in the way that quotients are
calculated.47
In the Huntington-Hill case for example, 83% of elections have no change in
46Between 1996 and 2016 infant mortality fell on average 0.62 a year and our estimated
impact on overall mortality rate (educated plus non-educated mothers) is 1.9. Hence:
1.9/0.62 ≈ 3.
47The formulas for the three alternate methods are respectively Qs =
V








the size of the mayor’s coalition and in 4.4% of elections the mayor’s coalition
gains a member, but in 12.4% of cases the mayor loses a coalition member.
So there is an 8% net increase in municipalities that would have an additional
legislator politically opposed to the mayor48.
Additionally, this paper emphasizes the importance of strengthening leg-
islative oversight to combate corruption and promote the good use of public
resources. Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson, and von Trapp (2008) document that
various tools of legislative oversight are common throughout the world, but they
are not universal.49 For example, in a sample of 39 countries— 25 of which are
OECD countries— only 28% have a specialized budget research organization
attached to the legislature.50 The number is likely much lower in a sample of
only developing countries. Our analysis suggests that strengthening legislative
oversight—by ensuring that legislative branches have the power and capacity
to audit executive spending and investigate wrongdoing— could be an effective
alternative or complement to centralized audit programs.
Finally, our research gives important direction to anti-corruption auditing
agencies throughout the world. Anti-corruption agencies are often resource-
constrained and may not know how to best focus their efforts. Our research
suggests that anti-corruption audits should focus on areas where the political
opposition is weak. In places where the opposition is strong, there is lower
corruption, and the legislature is capable of doing investigation. In places where
the opposition is weak, however, there is more corruption, and less capacity to
investigate it.
In conclusion, we use a regression discontinuity design to show that the
marginal politically opposed legislator can have a large impact in reducing cor-
ruption as well as improving healthcare provision and actual health outcomes.
48With the caveat that these simulations don’t take into account possible changes in strate-
gic responses that voters and politicians could make in response to a change in voting meth-
ods.
49See table 1.1 specifically.
50Table 6.6
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Finally, we address this work’s implications for the methods of proportional
representation that are most likely to encourage good governance, as well as
the importance of legislative oversight to combat corruption.
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Morais, Rogério. ‘Prefeito Puranci é condenado a perda de mandato em pro-
cesso aberto por dispensa de licitação.’ Grupo Fronteira Missões 23 Oct.
2017. Web. 22 Nov. 2017.
57
Nishijima, Marislei, Randall Ellis, and Regina Cati. ”Evaluating the impact of
Brazil’s central audit program on municipal provision of health services.”
Working Paper. 2016.
Nzelibe, Jide O., and Matthew C. Stephenson. ”Complementary constraints:
separation of powers, rational voting, and constitutional design.” Harv. L.
Rev. 123 (2009): 617.
Olken, Benjamin A. ”Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment
in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 115.2 (2007): 200-249.
Olken, Benjamin A., and Rohini Pande. ”Corruption in developing countries.”
Annu. Rev. Econ. 4.1 (2012): 479-509.
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. ”Separation of powers
and political accountability.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112.4
(1997): 1163-1202.
Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. ”Comparative politics
and public finance.” Journal of political Economy 108, no. 6 (2000): 1121-
1161.
Pettersson-Lidbom, Per. ”Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Re-
gression Discontinuity Approach.” Journal of the European Economic As-
sociation 6.5 (2008): 1037-1056.
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1.9.1 Additional Summary Statistics
Table 1.12: Election Data Summary Statistics
RD Sample Non-RD Sample Diff.
Tot. City Council Seats 9.311 9.344 -0.033
(1.963) (1.562) (0.053)
Second Term 0.279 0.315 −0.037∗∗
(0.448) (0.465) (0.015)
Mayor’s Coalitions’s seats 4.767 5.35 −0.583∗∗∗
(1.548) (2.319) (0.069)
Num. Coalitions in Municipality 4.654 5.12 −0.466∗∗∗
(2.5) (2.576) (0.082)
Num. Coalitions Supporting Mayor 1.852 2.165 −0.313∗∗∗
(1.105) (1.316) (0.041)
Mayor Coalition Rank 1.462 1.449 0.013
(0.818) (0.805) (0.026)
Anti-Mayor Coalition Vote Share 50.688 45.62 5.068∗∗∗
(14.251) (21.451) (0.64)
Opposition Seat Share 0.484 0.425 0.059∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.236) (0.007)
T 0.505 . .
(0.5) . .
R 0.001 . .
(0.011) . .
4192 1275 .
Full sample for 2004 election year (the year corresponding to most of the audit data). Means are
presented in the main row, standard deviations/errors are below in parenthesis.
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Table 1.13: Municipal Characteristics
RD Sample Non-RD Sample Diff.
AM Radio 0.213 0.236 −0.023∗
(0.409) (0.425) (0.013)
TV Station 0.102 0.127 −0.026∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.334) (0.01)
Judiciary District 0.472 0.492 -0.019
(0.499) (0.5) (0.016)
Avg. Monthly Income 433.133 446.383 −13.25∗∗
(196.475) (202.788) (6.447)
Illiteracy Rate 16.36 15.69 0.67∗∗
(9.862) (9.812) (0.315)
Urbanization Rate 63.263 65.589 −2.325∗∗∗
(21.978) (22.171) (0.708)
Population 2010 34135.8 34273.96 -138.153
(224619.0) (97499.66) (4420.171)
Tot. Votes Cast 17692.5 17334.42 358.079
(116821.2) (49890.38) (2282.044)
Observations 4192 1275 .
Full sample for 2004 election year (the year corresponding to most of the audit data). Means are
presented in the main row, standard deviations/errors are below in parenthesis.
Table 1.14: Conditional Summary Statistics
count mean sd min max
Total Audit Service Items 432 25.38657 10.13098 9 95
Total Corruption 432 1.479167 1.916961 0 13
Embezzlement 432 .4606481 .984015 0 8
Fraud 432 .5324074 1.149545 0 8
Overinvoicing 432 .5972222 1.287019 0 12
Other Irreg. 432 4.118056 3.786954 0 30
RD Sample, conditional on corruption being found
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Table 1.15: Public Service Assessment Questions
Variable Survey Questions
Nurse Present When you needed to be seen at the Family Health Unit,
was there a nurse there to serve you?
Dentist Present When you needed to be seen at the Family Health Unit
that has a dentist, were you served?
Physician Present When you needed to be seen at the Family Health Unit,
was there a physician there to serve you?
Healthcare Visits Does the family recieve visits from Community Health Agents?
Lines at Health Unit Have you or someone in your family had to wait in lines
to recieve care?
Auditor’s Assessment
Irregular Hiring Are there Community Health Agents that were contracted irregularly?








































































Figure 1.9: The density of opposition seat shares. The density clusters at levels
that are fractions of 9 because the majority of municipalities have 9 seats.
Figure 1.10 illustrates somewhat the variation from which we are identifying
the treatment effect. Particularly, it shows how this estimator can be seen as
a weighted average at various levels of voter preference, because we have data
close to the cutoff for a variety of total anti-mayor coalition vote shares.
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Figure 1.10: This figure illustrates that the estimator is a weighted average of
the treatment effect at a variety of thresholds (voter preference levels). The
faint pattern of upward-sloping lines comes from municipalities where there
were only 2 coalitions, in which case vote share maps 1-to-1 into the running
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Figure 1.11: Infant Mortality in Brazil
1.9.2 Additional Results
In the model shown in 2.3.1 we use conventional standard errors. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are biased in small samples, so we conduct the Breusch-
Pagan test to test for possible heteroskedasticity. We fail to reject the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticiy for all of our main outcome variables, with all
F-statistics arbitrarily close to zero. This is unsurprising, since due to the RD
design, we do not expect variance of the error term to be different between
municipalities where the anti-mayor coalition barely won an additional seat
versus municipalities where they barely didn’t win an additional seat. Results
available upon request.
Below we report results from Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik’s RD robust
estimator. Their ‘conventional’ standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors.
Tables 1.25 through 1.26 show results for all mayors, rather than just first
term mayors
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Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.22: CCT Robust Estimation








Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.23: CCT Robust Estimation








Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.24: Corruption, Extensive Margin (1/0)
Total Corruption Embezzlement Fraud Overinvoicing Other Irreg.
T -0.330∗ -0.101 -0.139 -0.0652 -0.0471
(0.177) (0.123) (0.117) (0.122) (0.133)
Obs 253 282 336 324 274
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on corruption, using the CCT optimal
bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Standard errors in parenthesis. Outcomes are the count
of items audited with a major violation. Other irregularities captures all other irregularities
found by auditors that were not classified as embezzlement, fraud, or overinvoicing,
and includes a host of procedural and other errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.25: Corruption Outcomes, First and Second Term Mayors
Total Corruption Embezzlement Fraud Overinvoicing Other Irreg.
T -0.876∗ -0.642∗∗ -0.271 -0.106 0.235
(0.474) (0.256) (0.259) (0.293) (0.911)
Obs 381 342 402 399 505
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on corruption, using the CCT optimal
bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Standard errors in parenthesis. Outcomes are the count
of items audited with a major violation. Other irregularities captures all other irregularities
found by auditors that were not classified as embezzlement, fraud, or overinvoicing,
and includes a host of procedural and other errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.26: Public Health Outcomes, First and Second Term Mayors
Panel A: Uneducated Mothers





Panel B: Educated Mothers





Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on public health outcomes, using the
CCT optimal bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Our seat-by-seat analysis is contained in figure 1.12, which plots the esti-
mated treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals for our main outcomes of
interest for each seat which we have enough data to get reasonable estimates.
The coefficients estimated are imprecise due to small sample sizes for some
seats, but a faint pattern emerges from the plots. It is usually the case the case
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Figure 1.12: Seat by Seat Effects
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1.10 Robustness Checks
1.10.1 BW Sensitivity Exercise
The following plots show the estimated treatment effects with 95% confidence
intervals from a variety of alternate model specifications for outcome variables of
interest, including various bandwidth selections and polynomial specifications.
In the plots, 1.0 is the optimal BW selected by the Calonico et al. (2015)
procedure and 0.5, for example, is half the optimal BW.
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1.10.2 Stability (External Validity) Test
Because regression discontinuity estimators estimate the treatment effect only
for a given value of the running variable, we test the stability of our RD esti-
mates using the method put forward by Dong and Lewbel (2015) and Cerulli et
al. (2017), which uses the treatment effect derivative (TED) as a measure of the
stability of our treatment effect estimates. Intuitively, this method tests what
would happen to treatment effect estimates if the RD cuttoff were changed.
Cerulli et al. suggest a rule of thumb for treatment effect stability, which is
that if the TED is statistically significant and the relative TED is below ap-
proximately 1, estimates may be unstable, or likely to change if the RD cutoff
were changed. We perform this test and find that our estimates of the effect
on corruption and the infant mortality rate are stable, while our estimates for
the effect of treatment on the presence of dentists and physicians shows signs of
instability. Cerulli et al. point out that ‘instability does not mean that the RD
estimates are invalid, but rather that they need to be interpreted cautiously.
In contrast, a finding of stability (i.e., a small TED) suggests some external va-
lidity, since it implies some other people, those away from but near the cutoff,
likely have treatment effects of similar magnitudes to those right at the cutoff.’
Table 1.27: Stability (External Validity) Test
Tot. Corruption Dentist Physician Inf. Mort.
Treatment -1.353∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.277∗∗ -3.402∗∗∗
(0.578) (0.139) (0.128) (1.254)
TED -223.9 156.9∗∗ 133.8∗∗ -434.1
(437.6) (74.06) (63.29) (479.8)
Bandwidth 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.010
Relative TED 0.995 0.258 0.236 0.757
Observations 244 2233 2751 19819
Clusters 121 130 3945
Using the test set forth in Dong and Lewbel (2015) and Cerulli et al. (2017)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.10.3 Balance Tests
Table 1.28: Balance Tests, Eq. 2.3.1 (Corruption Outcomes)
Marginal Legislator Characteristics
Male College High School Coalition Size
T -0.00119 -0.0654 -0.0255 0.00726
(0.0846) (0.107) (0.137) (0.395)
Obs 484 406 428 382
Native Mun. Native State Mayor Age Mayor Win Margin
T 0.0102 -0.0676 -0.946 -0.0347
(0.124) (0.0825) (2.508) (0.0370)
Obs 494 469 457 464
Municipality Characteristics
AM Radio TV Station Internet Prov. Metro
T 0.0122 0.0239 -0.207 0.00116
(0.126) (0.0761) (0.138) (0.0681)
Obs 389 457 417 421
Judiciary Illiteracy Rate Med. Month Inc. Bookstore
T 0.0154 -0.839 -7.715 0.150
(0.123) (2.585) (35.90) (0.127)
Obs 497 479 466 417
Urban. Rate Pct. < 25 yrs Council Wage Hrs Worked
T -7.514 1.222 -123.3 -0.259
(5.629) (1.787) (277.5) (1.879)
Obs 488 428 497 481
GDP per Cap GDP per Cap Growth Population Pop. Growth
T -2.361 -0.0120 -14809.1 -0.00616
(3.153) (0.0362) (9838.8) (0.00902)
Obs 416 427 524 394
Party Seat Shares
PMDB Share PSDB Share PFL Share PP Share
T 0.0106 0.0218 0.0210 0.0258
(0.0424) (0.0370) (0.0291) (0.0315)
Obs 427 434 366 491
PT Share PTB Share PDT Share Other Share
T -0.0434 0.00877 -0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0460
(0.0279) (0.0314) (0.0261) (0.0553)
Obs 427 410 417 510
Effect of the marginal opposing legislator. CCT optimal bandwidth, uniform kernel, s.e. in parenthesis.
The characteristics in the first panel correspond to the last legislator who won a seat in the city council,
except for the last two, which correspond to the mayor.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
75
Table 1.29: Balance Tests, Eq. 2.3.2 (Survey Outcomes)
Marginal Legislator Characteristics
Male College High School Coalition Size
T 0.149 -0.156 0.182 0.0509
(0.161) (0.200) (0.246) (0.727)
Obs 182 152 160 141
Native Mun. Native State Mayor Age Mayor Win Margin
T -0.224 -0.394∗∗ -4.167 -0.0462
(0.220) (0.158) (4.329) (0.0797)
Obs 186 176 173 171
Municipality Characteristics
AM Radio TV Station Internet Prov. Metro
T 0.0898 0.137 0.0928 0.00910
(0.215) (0.123) (0.250) (0.112)
Obs 143 173 156 165
Judiciary Illiteracy Rate Med. Month Inc. Bookstore
T 0.164 -2.276 -29.21 0.304
(0.218) (4.692) (62.38) (0.235)
Obs 189 178 176 156
Urban. Rate Pct. < 25 yrs Council Wage Hrs Worked
T -9.817 3.097 274.0 0.923
(9.670) (3.288) (505.6) (3.026)
Obs 183 160 189 180
GDP per Cap GDP per Cap Growth Population Pop. Growth
T -1.079 0.00674 1771.0 -0.0161
(3.854) (0.0694) (7517.3) (0.0116)
Obs 155 159 199 145
Party Seat Shares
PMDB Share PSDB Share PFL Share PP Share
T 0.00353 0.0964 0.0307 -0.0745
(0.0784) (0.0750) (0.0541) (0.0534)
Obs 158 160 131 183
PT Share PTB Share PDT Share Other Share
T -0.00613 -0.0101 -0.0325 0.00637
(0.0507) (0.0584) (0.0440) (0.0972)
Obs 158 152 154 192
Effect of the marginal opposing legislator. CCT optimal bandwidth, uniform kernel, s.e. in parenthesis.
The characteristics in the first panel correspond to the last legislator who won a seat in the city council,
except for the last two, which correspond to the mayor.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.30: Balance Tests, Eq. 2.3.3 (Health Outcomes)
Marginal Legislator Characteristics
Male College High School Coalition Size
T 0.0155 -0.0547∗ -0.0169 -0.344∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0289) (0.0340) (0.0993)
Obs 7368 6292 6540 5751
Clust 4735 4325 4421 4078
Native Mun. Native State Mayor Age Mayor Win Margin
T 0.0136 0.0227 0.227 0.0136
(0.0318) (0.0218) (0.650) (0.00840)
Obs 7305 7070 6879 7159
Clust 4712 4629 4549 4668
Municipality Characteristics
AM Radio TV Station Internet Prov. Metro
T 0.0363 0.0136 -0.0332 -0.0170
(0.0320) (0.0235) (0.0341) (0.0193)
Obs 6057 6854 6364 6494
Clust 4232 4534 4356 4171
Judiciary Illiteracy Rate Med. Month Inc. Bookstore
T 0.0291 0.265 -5.067 0.0567∗
(0.0308) (0.617) (9.718) (0.0325)
Obs 7430 7259 6996 6516
Clust 4756 4692 4599 4411
Urban. Rate Pct. < 25 yrs Council Wage Hrs Worked
T -1.118 -0.500 41.23 -0.112
(1.412) (0.433) (85.35) (0.508)
Obs 7303 6518 7533 7160
Clust 4709 4410 4731 4565
GDP per Cap GDP per Cap Growth Population Pop. Growth
T -0.861 0.0000621 17675.4 0.0000647
(0.833) (0.00924) (20618.5) (0.00200)
Obs 6427 6445 7766 6037
Clust 4368 4375 4831 4204
Party Seat Shares
PMDB Share PSDB Share PFL Share PP Share
T -0.0152 0.00399 0.0144∗∗ 0.00193
(0.00969) (0.00835) (0.00701) (0.00746)
Obs 6745 6803 5889 7402
Clust 4495 4512 4146 4742
PT Share PTB Share PDT Share Other Share
T 0.00221 -0.00523 -0.0137∗ 0.0272∗
(0.00677) (0.00680) (0.00717) (0.0144)
Obs 6548 6343 6362 7649
Clust 4424 4349 4355 4820
Effect of the marginal opposing legislator. CCT optimal bandwidth, uniform kernel, s.e. in parenthesis.
The characteristics in the first panel correspond to the last legislator who won a seat in the city council,
except for the last two, which correspond to the mayor.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
77
Table 1.31: Public Health Outcomes, First Term Mayors, With Controls
Panel A: Uneducated Mothers
Low Birth Weight 7+ P.N. Visits Preterm Infant Mort. Rate
T -0.613∗ -1.001 -0.841∗∗ -2.609∗
(0.320) (1.399) (0.347) (1.414)
Observations 14420 14741 17604 17135
Clusters 2988 3039 3443 3376
Panel B: Educated Mothers
Low Birth Weight 7+ P.N. Visits Preterm Infant Mort. Rate
T -0.153 -0.0769 -0.344 -0.363
(0.196) (1.201) (0.279) (0.760)
Observations 14828 14371 14136 13020
Clusters 3047 2978 2942 2778
Treatment effect of the marginal opposing legislator on public health outcomes, using the
CCT optimal bandwidth and a uniform kernel. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
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Difference in mayor’s coalition size from using the
Huntington-Hill Method rather than the D’Hondt Method.
Table 1.34
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1.11 Regular Expressions Used to Measure Corruption
Each violation found by the CGU auditors includes a description of the irregu-
larity. We use regular expressions to search for words and phrases that isolate
an irregularity as a certain type of corruption. We arrived at these words and
phrases after personally reading through audit reports and taking note of the
language used by the auditors. We have inspected a sample of irregularities
flagged by these regular expressions and found that they were indeed corrup-
tion.
Fraud: Any irregularites containing
• simulação OR simulado(a) OR simulações [‘simulation’ OR ‘simulated’
OR ‘simulations’ (of the bidding process)]
• montagem [‘assemblage/rigging’ (of the bidding process)]
• fraude OR fraudulento OR fraudar [‘fraud’ OR ‘fraudulent’]
• fachada OR fantasma [‘façade’ OR ‘phantom’ (referring to fake firms)]
Overinvoicing: Any irregularites containing
• superfatura [‘overinvoice’]
• sobrepreço [‘overprice’]
• preço superior OR preços superiores [‘higher price’ OR ‘higher prices’]
Embezzlement: Any irregularites containing
• falta de comprovação/comprovante AND (pagamento OR despesa OR
aplicação)
[‘lack of proof/receipt’ AND (‘payment’ OR ‘expenditure’ OR ‘aplica-
tion’)]
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• não comprovação AND (despesa OR aplicação)
[‘no proof/receipt’ AND (‘expenditure’ OR ‘aplication’)]
• (pagamento OR despesa OR aplicação) AND (sem comprovação/comprovante
OR sem documentação comprobatório)
[(‘payment’ OR ‘expenditure’ OR ‘application’ (of resources)) AND (‘with-
out proof/receipt’ or ‘without supporting documentation’)]
• não apresentação AND (documentos comprobatórios OR comprovação/comprovante)
AND (pagamento OR despesa OR aplicação)
[‘no presentation’ AND (‘proving documents’ OR ‘proof/receipt’) AND
(‘payment’ OR ‘expenditure’ OR ‘application’)]
• (pagamento OR despesa OR aplicação) AND (sem documento fiscal OR
sem suporte documental)
[(‘payment’ OR ‘expenditure’ OR ‘application’) AND (‘without fiscal doc-
uments’ OR ‘without documental support’)]
• (fiscal OR fiscais) AND (falsa OR inidônea OR fria)
[(‘fiscal’ OR ‘fiscals’) AND (‘false’ OR ‘disreputable’ OR ‘cold’ )] (‘cold
notes’ in portuguese are false fiscal notes)
• utilização AND recursos AND sem AND comprovação/comprovante AND
despesa
[‘utilization’ AND ‘resources’ AND ‘without’ AND ‘proof/receipt’ AND
‘expenditure’]
• ausência AND comprovação/comprovante AND (despesa OR pagamento)
AND length of description less than 75 characters
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[‘absence’ AND ‘proof/receipt’ AND (‘expenditure’ OR ‘payment’) AND
length of description less than 75 characters]
Note: The character restriction on the last bullet point is because there were
some irregularities with very long descriptions that included all of the chosen
words, but on inspection, were clearly not corruption.
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Chapter 2
Decomposing the Urban Wage Premium in Brazil:
Firms, Matching, and Compensating Wage Dif-
ferentials
2.1 Introduction
It is well documented that there is considerable heterogeneity in wages for
workers with similar skills and experience. One literature has documented
significant pay differences between rural and urban places (Glaeser and Maré
2001), and sought to understand why such pay differences exist. Meanwhile,
another literature has documented significant pay heterogeneity across firms
(Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999). Firms, meanwhile do not sort uniformly
across cities, and thus, a significant share of spacial wage heterogeneity may be
due to the way in which firms sort into cities.
A key challenge with studying how these two forms of wage heterogeneity
relate to each other is the difficulty of obtaining data that follows workers over
time and separately identifies both their city and employer. I study the ur-
ban wage premium in the context of Brazil using a detailed employer-employee
matched administrative dataset, and using this data I answer 3 important ques-
tions about the urban wage premium: (1) What role does firm sorting play
in the urban wage premium? (2) How important is firm and occupational
matching for agglomeration economies? (3) Are wages high in cities because of
compensating wage differentials?
I first show that a significant share of agglomeration economies in Brazil
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that are estimated using traditional methods— 44%— is actually due to posi-
tive selection of high-wage firms into larger cities, so they are in fact not really
agglomeration economies at all, suggesting that estimates of the agglomerations
economies that do not account for firm selection may significantly overestimate
the benefits of agglomeration. While worker selection has long been consid-
ered an issue to be dealt with in the estimation of agglomeration economies
(starting with Glaeser and Mare, 2001), firm selection into larger cities has not
received much attention, despite this large literature documenting significant
firm-level pay premia and discounts due to compensating wage differentials and
rent sharing (see Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013; and Sorkin, 2018; among
many others). I exploit the existence of multi-city firms (firms with multiple
establishments spanning at least two separate cities) to disentangle firm premia
from city premia for the first time.
The intuition for this estimation is similar to that of AKM models (Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999), where identification of firm and worker premia
comes from ‘movers’, workers who move firms, and identification only exists for
an interconnected set of firms and workers. In the present case, identification
comes from ‘overlappers’— firms with multiple establishments across different
cities, and similarly, effects are identified only for an interconnected set of cities,
firms, and individuals.
Agglomeration effects have been theorized to come from 3 main sources,
(1) sharing, (2) matching, (3) and learning (discussed in detail in Duranton
and Puga, 2004). My data is well-suited to understanding the role of employer
(firm) and occupational matching, so after establishing the importance of firm
effects in understanding the urban wage premium, I then move to estimating
the role that matching plays in agglomeration economies. A worker might be
particularly productive at a certain firm or occupation, and the likelihood of
finding a good match may be higher in cities because the labor market is thicker
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and there are more options. I find that these firm match effects account for 76%
of agglomeration effects. I then use occupational match effects rather than firm
match effects, and find that occupational matching accounts for around 39% of
the agglomeration effects. Finally, I include both match effects simultaneously
and find that firm and occupational matching together account for 87% of
agglomeration effects. In the context of the main microfoundational theories
for agglomeration economies described by Duranton and Puga (2004), these
results suggest that matching plays a large role in explaining agglomeration
economies in Brazil, while sharing and learning play less of a role.
In the first part of this paper I establish that the selection of high-wage
firms into larger cities accounts for a great deal of the urban wage premium.
But what are high-wage firms? Recent work by Sorkin (2018) has shown that a
majority of variation in firm premia is due to compensating wage differentials.
So does this mean that cities have high wages because jobs there have bad
characteristics that are being compensated for? To investigate this, I estimate
Sorkin’s model using the Brazilian data to get workers’ revealed-preference
valuation of jobs, and I find that jobs in larger cities have better non-wage
characteristics rather than worse. Thus, high wages in cities are not due to
compensating wage differentials.
I first contribute to the literature studying the urban wage premium. This
literature has documented significant pay and productivity differences between
urban and rural places, particularly in the developing world (Hicks, Kleemans,
Li, Miguel 2017; Gollin, Lagakos, Waugh 2013, Lagakos 2020). Recent work
has sought to understand why such differences persist, specifically studying
moving costs (Bryan and Morten 2019, Lagakos, Marshall, Mobarak, Vernot,
Waugh 2020), risk & uncertainty (Bryan, Chowdhury, Mobarak 2014), and
compensating wage differentials (Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos 2020). I
contribute to this literature by showing that firm sorting plays a key role in
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wage heterogeneity, that firm matching may play a role in the persistence of
these gaps, and that compensating wage differentials (measured quite broadly)
do not explain the urban wage premium.
This paper also contributes to the extensive literature that measures agglom-
eration economies, and seeks to understand their sources (see Bryan, Glaeser,
and Tsivanidis 2020 for a recent review). Starting with Glaeser and Maré
(2001), this literature has sought to eliminate worker-selection bias in the esti-
mation of aggolomeration effects by using panel data and including worker-level
fixed effects, and thus identifying agglomeration effects by the change in wages
or productivity that a worker experiences when they move to a different city.
Duranton and Puga (2004) lay out the key theoretical microfoundations that
may explain agglomeration economies, and more recently, empirical studies
have begun to measure the extent to which different theories matter, such as
learning (De la Roca and Puga 2017), occupational matching (Papageorgiou
2020), and assortative matching (Dauth et al. 2018). I contribute to this
literature by being the first (to my knowledge) to control for firm selection
in estimating agglomeration effects, and by showing that occupation and firm
match effects account for the majority of agglomeration effects.
2.2 Data
My main source of data is the RAIS dataset (Relação Anual de Informações
Sociais) maintained by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor. The RAIS dataset is
an employer-employee matched dataset containing essentially the entirety of
the formal sector of Brazil (the formal sector being a bit over 60% of the work-
force, depending on the year, according to International Labor Organization
estimates). The only workers/entities that are not reported in RAIS are the
informally employed, self-employed, elected officials, interns/trainees, domestic
employees, and cooperatives. Employees have a personal stake in making sure
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that they are reported in RAIS, because for many it guarantees that they recieve
their yearly bonus (Abono Salarial) paid by the government. RAIS contains
data for each worker on monthly wage, education level, a 6-digit occupation
code, a 5-digit industry code, employer, type of employment contract, location
of work, hiring date, and both date of and reason for end of employment.
For this paper I use data from 2009 to 2018, and for computational reasons
I take a random sample of 20% of people who worked during this time period.
I further restrict the sample by dropping all public sector workers (as their
wages are highly regulated), dropping all 1-person firms, and following Card
et al. (2013), I drop any part time jobs and restrict the sample to only male
workers. For each worker I keep only the ‘main job’ of each worker for each
year, where the ‘main job’ is defined as the job from which the worker earned
the most money that year. Finally, I restrict the sample to only the largest
interconnected set of firms and workers1 (which covers 99.89% of the sample),
and because identification comes only from ‘switchers’, I restrict the sample to
be only firm-switchers (as is common in this literature, again following Card et
al, 2013).
Beyond the RAIS data, the main data of importance is the definition of
agglomerations. Local Brazilian jurisdictions are known as municipalities, but
all agglomerations include many municipalities, so I need a way to aggregate
municipalities into distinct agglomerations. Brazil does define metropolitan re-
gions, similar to MSAs in the US, however these definitions are done at the state
level, and thus are not consistent across the country. Thus, I follow Chauvin
et al. (2017) and use microregions. Microregions are defined by the Brazil-
ian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), which groups municipalities
together that are economically integrated and have a common labor market.
There are 558 microregions in Brazil, and on average each microregion contains
9.89 municipalities. The largest microregion (in terms of population) is São
1I use the algorithm described in Abowd et al. (2002).
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Paulo, which contains 8 municipalities and had a population of 13.6 million
at the beginning of my sample in 2009. The smallest microregion is Japurá
in the Brazilian Amazon, which contains 2 municipalities and had a combined
population of 22,000 in 20092. To measure the populations of each microregion,
I use the IBGE’s 2009 municipal population estimates and sum across all mu-
nicipalities in each microregion. In what follows, I will use the term ‘city’ and
‘microregion’ interchangably.
In my sample there are 909,649 distinct firms, and 42,262 of these (about
4.7% of them) have establishments in multiple microregions, while 404 firms
have establishments in at least 20 microregions. The highest amount of mi-
croregions any one firm is in is 390, so no one firm is in all 558 microregions. I
implement the same algorithm as above to find the largest interconnected set
of firms and microregions, and find that these 42,262 multi-city firms together
span 555 of the 558 microregions in Brazil. Thus, I also drop the 3 unconnected
microregions from my sample.
2.3 Econometric Model
2.3.1 The Baseline AKM Model
In order to better understand the urban wage premium and agglomeration
economies, I follow previous literature and estimate the premium associated
with working in each city. To do this, I employ an AKM-style fixed effects
panel model. In my baseline specification, I follow previous literature and
estimate city premia (δc), controlling only for an individual worker effect (αi),
along with occupation, industry, experience and tenure (contained in Xit), as
shown in equation 2.3.1. The outcome variable, yit, is log wages for individual
i during year t.
2Technically, the smallest microregion is Fernando de Noronha, but this is an archipelago
200 miles off the northeastern coast of Brazil, and contains no municipalities.
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yit = β0 + β1Xit + δc + αi + γt + εit (2.3.1)
The AKM literature has established that firms are an important source of
wage heterogeneity (Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, 1999; Card, Heining, Kline,
2013), and if high-wage firms tend to select into large cities, this could bias
estimates of agglomeration effects. Thus, I next introduce to the specification
a firm effect (φj), to account for high-wage firms selecting into cities, as shown
in equation 2.3.2. Define δc as a city effect, αi is a worker effect, φj is a firm
effect, and θo is an occupation effect. The functions c(i, t), j(i, t), and o(i, t)
respectively give the city, firm, and occupation of individual i at time t.
yit = β0 + β1Xit + δc(i,t) + αi + γt + φj(i,t) + θo(i,t) + εit (2.3.2)
The goal of this equation is to get an unbiased estimate for δc, the city
premium. With this estimate of δc, we can estimate the elasticity of the city el-
ement of pay with respect to city size, which measures agglomeration economies.
An important note about this specification is that φj is a firm effect rather
than an establishment effect. This allows me to disentangle city premia from
firm premia, and as far as I know this is the first paper to do so. Disentangling
city premia from firm premia enables me to show that firm premia actually
account for a significant fraction of the city premium that is typically estimated
when firm effects are not considered. Estimation of this high-dimensional fixed-
effects model is done using the method described by Correia (2017).
2.3.2 Testing the Validity of AKM
According to the AKM literature, a key condition to get unbiased estimates of
δc is the ‘no endogenous mobility’ assumption. One way that this assumption
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could be violated is if workers or firms decide which city to work or operate in
based on a city-worker- or city-firm-specific idiosyncratic shock. I evaluate this
concern by creating a ‘symmetry graphs’ as done by Adhvaryu et al. (2020).
I start first evaluating the significance of selection based on city-worker
shocks. The intuition behind this procedure is to see if the wage losses of
people moving from high-wage cities to low-wage cities are roughly symmetric
to the gains of people making the opposite transition, moving from low-wage
cities to high-wage cities. If they are not— for example, if people moving from
high-wage cities to low-wage cities don’t experience wage declines, while people
making the opposite transition see wage increases— then this is evidence of
endogenous mobility, in other words, people choosing location based on a city-
worker specific idiosyncratic shock.
To create these symmetry graphs, I take each worker and their wage, and
group them into quartiles based on the average wage of the city they are in,
and for workers who then move to a different city, I get the wage quartile of the
new city, as well as the worker’s wage in the new city. The symmetry graph
is then made by graphing the average wage change from moving up in the
city distribution by the average wage change of workers making the opposite
move (moving down in the city distribution), for moves between each of the
4 quartiles of the city distribution. The wages I use are log wages, projected
on firm dummies, in order to control for the fact that high-wage cities tend to
have high-wage firms.
The graph resulting from this procedure is shown in figure 2.2 in the ap-
pendix. As can be seen, wage gains and losses are symmetric along a -45 degree
line, indicating that selection based on city-worker idiosyncratic shocks is un-
likely to be an issue.
Next I evaluate the significance of selection on city-firm shocks. This pro-
cedure is similar to the procedure above, except that because firms don’t often
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move from city to city, instead I look at firms that have multiple establishments
in different cities, and I look to see if the differences in wages between the head-
quarters and satellite establishments are symmetric between firms where the
satellite establishment is in a lower-wage city versus firms where the satellite
establishment is in a higher-wage city3. The idea here is to examine if firms
systematicaly choose to expand in to cities where they might have some positive
idiosyncratic shock.
To create this graph I take the average wage and the city quartile of each
non-headquarter establishment, and then I get the average wage and city quar-
tile of that firm’s headquarters establishment. I graph the difference between
satellite establishment average wages and headquarters average wages for es-
tablishments in a higher quartile than their headquarters by the same difference
for opposite quartile difference. The wages I use here are log wages, projected
on occupation dummies, in order to control for the fact that firms may have
different occupations working in different cities.
The graph resulting from this procedure is shown in figure 2.3 in the ap-
pendix. Again, as can be seen, wage differences are symmetric, accounting for
the fact that satellite establishments always pay a constant amount less than
the headquarters, whether the headquarters is in a lower- or higher-wage city.
One additional way to test for the importance of city-worker or city-firm
idiosyncratic shocks is to directly include city-worker and city-firm dummies
in the regression, and see if this improves the fit of the model. In table 2.5 I
show the R2 and Adjusted R2 for the baseline estimating equation (equation
2.3.2), and then a version of this equation with city-worker interaction effects
added in, one with city-firm effects added in, and lastly a specification with
both city-worker and city-firm fixed effects added in. As can be seen, while the
R2 does increase slightly with the addition of these variables (as is natural when
3Crucially, my data separately indicates headquarter establishments from secondary es-
tablishments.
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adding in a huge vector of variables), the adjusted R2 actually decreases with
the addition of these variables, suggesting that these city-worker and city-firm
effects do not fit the data well, thus once again implying that they are not an
issue biasing results.
2.3.3 Decomposing Agglomeration Effects
While it is of interest to estimate δc(i,t) in order to measure agglomeration
effects, it is also of interested to break down δc(i,t) into some component parts,
in order to understand where the agglomeration economies are coming from.
Thus, let’s write a richer model of δc(i,t), which accounts variation in the quality
of firm and occupational matching by city, as well as a residual city effect that
measures all city effects that are not accounted for by the match effects. The
goal now is to understand how much of the city premium is due to firm and
occupational matching versus other factors.
We can separate match effects into two sources. There is within-city varia-
tion in match effects, as well as across-city variation in match effects. We can
attribute across-city variation in match effects to agglomeration effects (con-
trolling for firm and individual effects, if there are on average better matches
in one place, then this is part of the city effect). Define ξi,j(i,t) to be a firm-
worker match effect for a match between worker i and firm j, and ζi,o(i,t) to be
an occupation-worker match effect for match of worker i with occupation o. I
want to capture the across-city variation in both firm and occupation matches,
which is given by the average match effect in the city. So assuming that these
match effects are additively seperable, we can write









and (i, t) ∈ c denotes
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observations where worker i at time t is in city c, and then λc is the residual
city effect, capturing the city premium that is left over after accounting for firm
and occupational match effects.
The terms ξc(i,t) and ζc(i,t) are both averages of the firm and occupation
match effects in a given city across individuals and time. In order to get these
averages, we need to estimate the actual match effects. What we can do now is
write a more nuanced version of the firm and occupation effects, where instead
of firm and occupation effects being constant across all workers, they vary by
worker, thus becoming ‘match effects’. For each individual i, these match effects
are only identified for firms j and occupations o that individual i works in for
some time periods, and not others. Since the mean firm and occupation match
effects (mean by city, that is) are already included in δc, then these worker-firm
and worker-occupation match effects will be demeaned by city average, like so:
(ξi,j(i,t) − ξc(i,t)) and (ζi,o(i,t) − ζc(i,t)). In other words, these terms capture the
within-city variation in matches. Replacing the simple firm and occupation
effects with these firm and occupation match effects, equation 2.3.1 becomes
yit = β0 + β1Xit + δc(i,t) + αi + γt
+ (ξi,j(i,t) − ξc(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demeaned firm match effects
+ (ζi,o(i,t) − ζc(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demeaned occupation match effects
+εit
(2.3.3)
Plugging in for δc, we can write the equation like this,
yit = β0 + β1Xit + (ξc(i,t) + ζc(i,t) + λc(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δc(i,t)
+αi + γt
+ (ξi,j(i,t) − ξc(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demeaned firm match effects
+ (ζi,o(i,t) − ζc(i,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demeaned occupation match effects
+εit
(2.3.4)
The positive and negative versions of both ξc(i,t) and ζc(i,t) that are part of
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δc and the match effect, respectively, cancel each other out. So this equation
can just be estimated as
yit = β0 + β1Xit + λc(i,t) + αi + γt + ξi,j(i,t) + ζi,o(i,t) + εit (2.3.5)
And this equation will give us an estimate for λc, which tells us the residual
city premium that is left over after controlling for match effects. We can also
calculate ξc(i,t) and ζc(i,t) after estimation.
Following this ‘first stage’ which estimates the city premia, I estimate the
elasticity of city premium with respect to city population with the regression
in equation 2.3.6, where β is the coefficient of interest.
δc = α + βLog(Populationc,2009) + νc (2.3.6)
The elasticity estimated by this equation is commonly used as a measure
of agglomeration effects, as it shows how wages increase with density. In my
empirical estimates, I will use the city premium of each city, δc as the outcome
in the elasticity estimation above, and I will also estimate elasticities with the
residual city premium λc (which captures what is left over of the city premium
after firm and occupation matching are accounted for) and various intermediate
residual city premiums (where only firm matching or only occupation matching
are accounted for) as outcomes as well. These ‘intermediate’ city premia are
simply the coefficients on the city dummies in various specifications of my
model.
2.4 Results
First I estimate equation 2.3.2 and plot the estimated city effects (microregion
premium) against the log population of each city in figure 2.1. Because from the
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scatterplot it is clear that agglomeration economies only exist after a certain
level of agglomeration is reached, I also graph the line from a nonparametric
kernel regression in order to see more clearly how the city premium changes
with population. As can be seen, the slope of the line is flat for smaller agglom-
erations, and only becomes positive at agglomerations with log population of
at least 12.5, which translates into a population of 268,337. This suggests that
agglomeration effects may only kick in after a certain level of agglomeration.
For my estimates of the elasticity of city effects with respect to city population
I use only cities above this population level, similar to restrictions made by
previous researchers (Chauvin et al. 2017; De la Roca and Puga 2017).
Figure 2.1: This graph uses the city premium estimates from column (2) of
table 2.1. The vertical line is at 12.5, which implies a population of 268,337.
In Panel A of table 2.1 I estimate increasingly nuanced versions of the fixed
effect model shown in section 2.3, which gives me the city premium and residual
city premiums. For each specification in columns 1 through 7, in panel B I take
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the coefficient associated with the city dummy variable estimated in panel A of
the same column, and I estimate the elasticity of these coefficients with respect
to population, as has previously been done in the literature. Thus, Column(3)
gives the elasticity of δc with respect to city size, and column (7) gives the
elasticity of λc with respect to city size, with the columns in between giving
intermediate residual city premia.
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Table 2.1: Elasticity of City Premium with respect to Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Regression equation 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.5
Panel A: ‘First Stage’— estimate microregion premium
Experience 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.00750∗∗∗ 0.00421∗∗∗ 0.00329∗∗∗ 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.00584∗∗∗ -0.000826
(0.00128) (0.000768) (0.000679) (0.00112) (0.000831) (0.000696) (0.00121)
Tenure 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.00613∗∗∗ 0.00954∗∗∗ 0.00900∗∗∗ 0.00585∗∗∗
(0.00107) (0.000749) (0.000535) (0.000314) (0.000463) (0.000319) (0.000288)
Observations 26767300 26612592 26587212 20083395 21344483 21210114 18631618
Microregions 555 555 555 555 555 555 555
City Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupation Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual Effects N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects N N Y Y N Y Y
Firm Match Fixed Effects N N N Y N N Y
Occupation Match Fixed Effects N N N N Y Y Y
Panel B: Elasticity of Estimated City Premium with respect to City Size
Log Pop. 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.00625 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.00317
(0.0154) (0.0116) (0.00742) (0.00393) (0.00939) (0.00613) (0.00359)
Observations 158 158 158 158 158 158 158
Panel C: Percent Change in Elasticity from Baseline
Equation 2.3.1 as baseline - (Baseline) 44.47% 86.17% 26.99% 66.15% 92.99%
Equation 2.3.2 as baseline - - (Baseline) 76.10% - 39.04% 87.37%
In Panel A of this table I estimate the fixed effect models described in section 2.3, and then in Panels B I estimate the elasticity of city
premium with respect to city population implied by the corresponding microregion premiums (‘city effects’) estimated in the corresponding column of
Panel A. In panel B, the sample is restricted to agglomerations of over 268,337 people. Standard errors in parenthesis
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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For completeness, I first estimate a pooled OLS specification in column (1)
where I leave out the individual effect. The estimate for the elasticity is about
.0632, which is a bit larger than previous estimates of similar specifications that
don’t control for individual effects, as the estimates in Combes et al (2010) for
France, Glaeser and Resseger (2010) for the US, Keisuke (2017) for Japan,
and De la Roca and Puga (2017) for Spain. Next in column (2) I estimate the
model shown in 2.3.1, which I consider to be my baseline model. When I include
individual fixed effects, the elasticity becomes .0452, which is significantly larger
than estimates from more wealthy countries. For example, De la Roca and
Puga (2017) estimate an elasticity of .0241 for Spain. This difference may
simply come from differing definitions of what an urban area is, and so I don’t
focus on comparing elasticity estimates across countries. Rather, I will focus
on comparing elasticity estimates within Brazil, comparing the elasticity of city
premia with respect to city size to the elasticity of various residual city premia
with respect to city size.
Next, I begin to incorporate controls for firms. In the literature study-
ing agglomeration economies, controlling for individual effects has long been
a common practice, as it controls for high-ability workers selecting into cities.
However, the issue of selection of highly-productive (or high-wage) firms into
cities has only barely begun to be considered (Dauth et al. 2018). In order to
disentangle firm effects from city effects, I utilize the existence of ‘overlapping
firms’— that is, an interconnected set of multi-city firms. The intuition behind
this is similar to the identification of firm and individual effects in the AKM
model, with identification coming from ‘movers’— workers who move from one
firm to another— but in this case since firms rarely move, I use firms that
simultaneously exist in multiple cities via different establishments. Once I con-
trol for firm selection in column (3), I find that the urban wage premium drops
significantly. The elasticity of city premium with respect to population drops
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from .0452 to .0251, a 44% drop4. This estimate— .0251— is my preferred esti-
mate of the elasticity of wages with respect to population, because it properly
controls for the selection of high-wage firms into large urban areas. This result
suggests that previous work that does not consider the selection of high-wage
firms into urban areas may significantly overestimate agglomeration effects.
This drop in apparent agglomeration economies that results from controlling
for firm premia is quite large, and so next I investigate the reason for this
drop. There are 2 possible reasons that controlling for firm effects changes the
estimated agglomeration effect: (1) firms with larger pay premia tend to locate
themselves in larger cities, or (2) migrants tend to match differently in the
distribution of firms after they migrate to a city.
I first examine the possibility that high-wage firms tend to locate themselves
in larger cities. To see how large of a factor this difference might be in explaining
the drop in estimated agglomeration effects, I estimate the elasticity of average
firm premia received by workers with respect to population. To do this I first
take the exponential of estimated firm effects for each person-year in the data,
and then I find the average of this by microregion. After I have this microregion
average of firm effects, and then take its log again5. A similar procedure is
followed for getting the average person effect by city.
Table 2.2: Elasticity of Firm and Person Effects with respect to Population
Avg. Firm Effect Avg. Person Effect
Log Pop. 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0483∗∗∗
(0.00796) (0.00763)
Observations 158 158
Outcome variables are the average firm and person effects received by workers
in each city. Standard errors in parenthesis
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In table 2.2 I find that the elasticity of firm premia with respect to city size
41 - 0.0251/ 0.0452 = 44.47%
5The reason for taking the exponential and then taking the log is of course that the log
function is not a linear function, and so the sum of logs is not the same is a log of sums.
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is large enough that it suggests that rural-urban migrants may match lower
in the firm distribution after they migrate, because the elasticity of firm pre-
mia with respect to city size (.0266) accounts for more than the decline in the
elasticity the results from include the firm effects (.0201)6. In other words, if
migrating workers matched to firms in the same part of the firm effect distri-
bution in destinations as their origin, then we would expect to see a slightly
bigger decrease in the elasticity of the city effect with respect to population
when we control for firm effects.
As a comparison, I also estimate the elasticity of person effects with respect
to city size, which measures selection of high-ability workers into larger cities,
and I find that the elasticity is large (in comparison to the elasticity of city
effects with respect to population), but only slightly larger than the elasticity
of firm effects with respect to city size.
To see if there are such differences in how workers match in the distribution
of firms, I examine assortative matching for migrants compared to the rest of
workers in both urban and rural places. In table 2.3 I show the correlation
between firm effects and person effects for all the workers in my sample, dif-
ferentiated by urban vs rural (defining urban places as cities in the top 10% of
population, and rural in the bottom 90% of population) and differentiated by
rural-urban migrants vs. all workers. As can be seen in the first row, urban
workers tend to do much more positive assortative matching than rural workers,
in line with recent work done by Dauth et al. (2018) with German data. What
is interesting here is that while migrants tend to be more positively matched
than the average worker in rural places before migrating, they are less positively
matched than the average worker in urban places that they go to (even while
they themselves become more positively matched when the move to an urban
area).
Thus it seems that the decrease in elasticity of city effect with respect to city
6.0452-.0251 = .0201
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Table 2.3: Correlation between firm effects and person effects
Rural Urban
All workers .1578 .2691
Migrants .2125 .2431
size is driven largely by the fact that high-wage firms tend to be located in cities,
and is in small part counteracted by the fact that migrants tend to match lower
in urban areas than they do in rural areas. This may help to explain why such
large wage differences persist between urban and rural places— while migrants
may move to a high-paying city, they may have a difficult time matching with
high-wage firms.
Having established the importance of controlling for firm premia when esti-
mating agglomeration effects, I now turn to further decomposing agglomeration
effects. Agglomeration effects are thought to come from 3 main sources: (1)
sharing, (2) matching, (3) and learning (see Duranton and Puga, 2004).
In order to study the importance of matching, I now estimate a more nu-
anced model that incorporates firm match effects to capture the increased op-
portunity in cities to match to a firm that may suit a person well, and where
they may be particularly productive. These firm match effects are simply a sep-
arate indicator for each firm-worker pair. In Column (4) I find that once these
match effects are accounted for, the elasticity of the city effects with respect to
city size is quite small (.00625). These firm match effects account for 76%7 of
agglomeration economies, compared to the baseline specification estimated in
column (3).
Now in column (5) I remove the firm effects and now focus on occupational
match effects. These occupational match effects are an indicator for each unique
worker-occupation pair, using 5-digit occupation codes. Then in column (6) I
redo this analysis, but putting the firm effects back in. I find that occupational
71 - .00625/.0251 = 76.10%
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match effects account for about 39%8 of the urban wage premium, again using
equation 2.3.2 as the base model. This estimate is similar to recent work by
Papageorgiou (2020), who uses a structural model and US data, and finds that
occupational matching accounts for 35% of the urban wage premium.
Finally, in column (7) I put both the firm and match effects in, which gives
us the specification outlined in equation 2.3.5, and thus the elasticity in panel
B is the elasticity of the residual city premium, λc with respect to city size.
I find that compared to the baseline model (column 2), the firm and match
effects combined account for a total of 87%9 of the elasticity of city premium
with respect to city size10. This result is consistent with cities in Brazil existing
as huge labor markets, where high-wage firms and high-wage workers go to find
good matches. Thus, in Brazil at least, sharing and learning effects seem to play
a comparatively small role in the urban wage premium compared to matching
effects.
2.5 High Wage Firms and Compensating Wage Differ-
entials
We know from the above that a significant amount of the urban wage premium
is explained by high-wage firms selecting into bigger cities. But what are high-
wage firms anyway? Until recently, the AKM firm premium (the fact that
there is a firm premium or discount paid to all employees) was well established
empirically, but mostly a black box, with some possible explanations being firms
sharing rents with workers or compensating differentials, but little quantitative
evidence as to the relative importance of these factors.
This changed with Sorkin (2018) when Sorkin introduced a structural model
81 - 0.0153/ 0.0251 = 39.04%
91 - .00317/.0251 = 87.37
10The separate estimation of the firm effects and match effects does not add up to be the
same as when I estimate them simultaneously because some people simultaneously switch
both firms and occupations.
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to estimate the revealed-preference valuation of employment at a given firm,
and found that 70% or more of variation in the firm component of wages is due
to compensating differentials. So coming back to the present study, does this
imply that firms pay more in cities just because there are bad non-wage char-
acteristics? While cities have amenities that people enjoy, such as restaurants,
arts, and live entertainment ranging from sports to theater, cities are also asso-
ciated with traffic, pollution, crime, and high cost of living. In order to answer
this question I will estimate a modified version of Sorkin’s model in order to get
workers’ revealed-preference valuation of employment at each establishment, to
see if workers value jobs in bigger cities more or less than jobs in smaller cities.
The intuition behind Sorkin’s model is to use ‘endogenous’ worker flows—
flows where the worker chooses move jobs, and thus reveals their preferences—
to see which are the best establishments to work for, according to the workers.
In the structural analysis I will now use establishments instead of firms, for
reasons that will be seen below. To see Sorkin’s model mathematically, assume
N workers are choosing between working for establishment k and establishment
j. Workers at establishment k receive Ṽk utility plus an idiosyncratic draw that
is distributed type I extreme value with scale parameter 1. Then, according to








where Mkj is the flow of workers going from establishment j to establishment
k. The main adaptation I make to Sorkin’s model is that instead of estimating
the likelihood that a given move is endogenous (as Sorkin does), I observe
directly if a given flow results from a quit rather than a layoff, and I use only
these flows that result from quits. Thus, the assumption is that these quits
are endogenous (reveal workers’ preferences). In some countries, quits may not
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reveal preferences because a person may be pressured to resign or may quit
pre-emptively when getting fired is on the horizon. However, this is not the
case in Brazil. Brazilian labor law makes firing very costly to firms, and fired
employees receive many benefits that quitting employees do not receive.11 The
incentive as an employee to get fired rather than quit is in fact so strong that
employees wishing to terminate employment will sometimes ask to be fired.12
Thus, we can be sure that quits are indeed revealing workers’ preferences for one
firm over another, and are generally not the result of some exogenous pressure
to resign instead of being fired.
Now, if we take 2.5.1 and sum over all establishments j and then rearrange,






This equation tells us that good establishments hire away from other good
establishments, and have few people quit from them. However, to get the true
value of working at the establishment, we need to correct for establishment size
and the job offer distribution,




where gj represents the relative size of establishment j, (1 − δj)(1 − ρj)
represents the probability of not facing an exogenous shock that sends you to
either unemployment (δj) or a different job (ρj), and fj represents the relative
share of job offers extended by establishment j. The rest of Sorkin’s method





Once I have the estimates of V ej , the utility of working for each establish-
ment j, there are 3 outcomes of interest to understand the role of compensating
wage differentials in explaining the urban wage premium. The first is the av-
erage V e received by workers in each city. The second is the value of non-wage
characteristics received by workers in each city. I calculate this by regressing
V e on φ (a vector of the establishment premia estimated from an AKM model),
then calculating the residual.13 Thus, this measurement of non-wage charac-
teristics is any part of the average value of working at an establishment that
is not explained by the establishment premium14. Third is a measure of the
city-specific component of V e. The city-specific component of V e can be cal-
culated by comparing the value of employment among different establishments
of the same firm, but are in different cities. This can be done by regressing V e
on city and firm effects, and taking the coefficients on the city effects as the
city-specific component of V e. This procedure once again uses identification
from multi-city firms. Intuitively, what this procedure does is it asks if workers
prefer to work at Sam’s Club in São Paulo vs. Sam’s Club in Porto Alegre or
Sam’s Club in Goiânia.15
Once I have these 3 outcomes of interest, I estimate the elasticity of each of
them with respect to population. These estimates are presented in table 2.4.
I find that jobs in bigger cities give workers much more utility V e, and as
column (2) tells us, much of this comes from non-wage characteristics, rather
than just the higher wages. The coefficient in column (3) tells us that the higher
utility received in larger cities is not due to favorable city characteristics, but
rather the characteristics of the types of jobs that tend to be in larger cities.
13Concretely, run the regression V ej = α0 + α1φj + uj and then the value of non-wage
characteristics is defined as ûj = V
e
j − α̂0 − α̂1φj
14The establishment premium is estimated from an equation like equation 2.3.2, but using
establishment dummies instead of firm dummies, and dropping out the city dummies.
15Specifically, estimate the regression V ej = τc(j) + γk(j) + νj , where τ and γ are city and
firm fixed effects, respectively, c(j) is a function that tells what city establishment j is in,
and k(j) is a function that tells what firm establishment j is part of. The outcome of interest
(the city-specific V e) is then the vector of τc coefficients.
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Table 2.4: Population and Revealed-Preference Value of Jobs
Avg. V e Non-wage Chars. City-Specific V e
Log Pop. 0.0981∗∗∗ 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0353
(0.0256) (0.0233) (0.0273)
Observations 158 158 158
Standard errors in parenthesis
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In other words, the positive amenities of larger cities (restaurants, arts, enter-
tainment, ect.) seem to be cancelled out by the negatives (traffic, pollution,
high cost of living, ect.). This is consistent with theory by Rosen (1974) and
Roback (1982).
So compensating wage differentials do not explain the high wages found in
cities of Brazil, consistent with the findings of Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos
(2020), who study public goods, crime, and pollution (which are a subset of my
measure of compensating wage differentials) for a set of sub-Saharan African
countries. Rather, my findings imply that wages are high in parger cities be-
cause firms there share more rents with workers (presumably because they have
more rents).
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I use detailed panel data to study the urban wage premium and
aggolomeration economies in Brazil. I show that firm selection— an element not
previously considered by researchers estimating agglomeration economies— ac-
counts for a significant portion of the estimated elasticity of city premium with
respect to city population, implying that estimates of agglomeration economies
that do not account for firm selection are significantly upward-biased. Then
I show that when controlling for firm selection is combined with controls for
firm and occupational matching, this accounts for the majority of estimated
agglomeration effects, suggesting that cities (in Brazil at least) exist because
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they provide a large labor market where high-wage firms and high-wage work-
ers can go and find productive matches. Finally, I examine the possibility that
compensating wage differentials explain the high wages in cities. I show that
jobs in larger cities in fact have better non-wage characteristics rather than
worse, and thus compensating wage differentials do not explain the high wages
of cities.
The findings of this paper are particularly interesting in light of the COVID-
19 pandemic, and suggest some avenues of new research. Due to the pandemic
many people have been leaving cities as remote work becomes more widespread,
leading some commentators to wonder if there will be decreased productivity
due to decreased agglomeration effects. Because I find that a significant portion
of agglomeration effects come from occupation and firm matching, this suggests
that productivity need not decline much, because new online labor markets may
still be able to provide the high-quality matching that cities also perform.
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2.8 Appendix
Figure 2.2: Testing for selection on city-worker shocks. This graph tests for
endogenous mobility in the AKM model, following Adhvaryu et al. (2020).
Each point shows the wage gains from moving up from city quartile X to city
quartile Y, by the wage loss from moving down from quantile Y to quantile X,
for all quartiles Y > X.
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Figure 2.3: Testing for selection on city-firm shocks. This graph tests for
endogenous mobility in the AKM model, following Adhvaryu et al. (2020).
Each point shows the wage difference between satellite establishments in city
quartile X and headquarters in city quartile Y, by the wage differences between
satellite establishments in city quantile Y to and headquarters in quantile X,
for all quartiles Y > X.
Table 2.5: Testing for endogenous mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline (eq 2.3.2)) City-worker effects City-firm effects Both
Observations 26587212 24453961 26584871 24444073
R2 0.872 0.898 0.876 0.900
Adj. R2 0.839 0.818 0.835 0.810
First column is the baseline (equation 2.3.2), second column ads a city-worker interaction effect,
the third column instead ads a city-firm interaction effect, and the fourth column includes both of these.
2.9 Structural Model
I take Sorkin’s (2018) framework, but I am able to simplify because I know
when people quit. Then, the portion of workers N who choose employer k over
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and equation (7) is
S−1Mexp(Ṽ ) = exp(Ṽ )
And M must be filled with the ’strongly connected set’ of employers





































j gj(1− δj)(1− ρj)
(2.9.1)
Equations (18) and (19), which estimate the probability that a given separa-
tion is exogenous, is not used in my setup, because I directly observe quits and




Step 0 Initialize {V ej }j∈ε with guesses. Compute the relative size of employers
(gi), number of workers (W ), exogenous separation probabilities (δj and
ρj), and the share of people hired from nonemployment/informal employ-
ment by firm j, f oj from the data.
Step 1 Build the M matrix, where the (j, k) entry is the amount of people who
quit at employer k and join employer j.
Step 2 Using equation (7), estimate the fixed point exp(Ṽ ) (using a loop).
Step 3 Compute f , exp(V ej ) exp(V
n), and λ1, as detailed below
Step 4 Here Sorkin returns to step 1 in a loop to re-estimate exogenous/endogenous
flow probabilities until things converge, but because I’m just using quits
and not estimating the exogenous/endogenous flow probabilities, I’m done.
Details on step 3






exp(V ej′) + exp(V
n)
(2.10.1)
then f oj , the share of people hired from nonemployment by firm j, can be








Now, take an initial guess for λ1. Next I evaluate two equations. I will follow
the convention that known quantities are on the left-hand side, and unknown
















j ) + exp(V
n)] (2.10.3)
































Now from equations 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, we know C1exp(V
e
j ) and C1exp(V
n)
Next rewrite equation 2.3.1 by multiplying by C1
C1
and rearranging
f oj = fj
exp(V ej )























Where the left and side is known because of equations 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
Now we can solve for C1 using the fact that
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Now that C1 is known, we can get all of the fj. Knowing C1 also gives us
exp(V n) and exp(V ej ) via equations 2.3.2 and 2.3.3
Given the parameters of the model, choose λ1 so that the number of en-


























Teachers in Politics: Teacher-Politicians, Gen-
der, and the Representation of Public Educa-
tion
3.1 Introduction
In many developing countries, government is decentralized and local politicians
can have a large effect on public service provision. Furthermore, most legislators
on the city council (and even some mayors) are moonlighting politicians, who
keep their day job, and work as a legislator only part time, forming a close
connection between their occupation group and the municipal government.
In Brazil, a high number of these moonlighting politicians are school teach-
ers1. At least one teacher runs for city council in 83% of municipalities, and
at least one is elected in 36%. Politician-teachers may have a positive effect
on schools or they may have a negative effect. City councillors have oversight
responsibility that could include inspecting schools and bringing deficiencies
to the attention of the mayor. Teachers have an intimate knowledge of the
challenges that the city’s schools face, and many of them run their campaigns
emphasizing the fact that they are school teachers, a possible signal that they
will give particular attention to the city’s schools2. On the other hand, corrup-
1School teachers are the 3rd largest occupation group among city councillors in Brazil
(after farmers and business operators), making up 5% of elected city councillors across the
country.
2In campaigns in Brazil, candidates register their candidate name with the Superior Elec-
toral Court (TSE), which is not usually their full legal name, but usually some variation on
the first name. For school teachers, 30% of them run with some variation the word professor
(teacher) in their campaign name.
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tion in the Brazilian education system is well documented (Ferraz et al. 2012),
and teachers who know how the system works may have more knowledge of
how to extract illicit rents, and may have the credibility and capability to mask
fraudulent projects as legitamate.
In order to empirically test the effect that teachers have on the city counsel,
I use a regression discontinuity design that compares outcomes from munici-
palities where a teacher won a seat in the city council by a narrow margin to
those where a teacher lost the seat by a narrow margin. As outcomes, I use
employee data from the RAIS dataset (Relação Anual de Informações Socias)
as well as principal survey data and student test score data from Prova Brasil.
I find that when a female teacher is elected to the city council, the city hires
more teachers, hires more qualified teachers, and pays them more.
Not only do female teachers on the city council improve the hiring of teach-
ers, but they have a direct effect on quality of schools. Using principal survey
data, I find that having a female teacher on the city council also increases the
likelihood that the city’s schools have necessary teaching resources, books, and
financing, and possibly increases student test scores. No statistically significant
effect is found for male teachers elected to the city council.
There are two (non-mutually exclusive) possible explanations for this large
difference in effects. One is that women’s connection to the education system
amplifies existing gender policy preference differences for men versus women
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Brollo and Troiano
2016). Another explanation could be that differing career concerns influence the
way men and women view political representation. Men who are elected to the
city council may see themselves as transitioning to a political career, whereas
women elected to the city council may simply see themselves as representing
the interests of the schools for a time, and then leaving politics. Thus, the
male teachers who were elected would not give particular attention to the city’s
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schools, but the women would. I provide some suggestive evidence for this
second explanation.
This research contributes to a literature that studies how political factors
can effect public services, particularly education (Akhtari et al. 2017; Colonelli
et al. 2017). It also contributes the literature on gender differences in politics
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Brollo and Troiano
2016). Though Chattopadhyay and Duflo find that gender differences drive
differences in policy choice, I show evidence that while simple gender differences
do account for some of the effect, the majority of the effect is coming from the
occupational connection, rather than gender. The work of Brollo and Troiano
bears particular relevance to my reserach, as their findings suggest that female
mayors may be less likely to engage in strategic political behavior.
This paper is also related to a large literature that estimates the effect of po-
litical connections on firms (Fisman (2001), Kwaja and Mian (2005), Adhikari
(2006), Claessens et al. (2008), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Li et al. (2008),
Chen et al. (2011), Asher and Novosad (2017), Akcigit et al. (2018)), which
finds that firms who are politically connected are favored by the government. In
this paper I find that this result holds similarly for the public sector. Branches
of public services that have political connections are favored by politicians.
3.2 Institutional Background
In Brazil, cities (municipalities) are governed by a mayor and a city council.
While the mayor has ultimate control over implementation of government pro-
grams, the city council plays a key role in that it brings suggestions for policies
and programs to improve the municipality, passes city ordinances, and must
approve the mayor’s budget.
Most city councils have 9 to 11 seats (95% of municipalities), but some of
the very large cities have huge city councils (up to 54 people). I focus my
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analysis on city councils with 9 to 11 seats, since with the large cities, adding
one teacher amounts to a very small change in overall composition.
Primary education in Brazil is split into two halves, with municipal gov-
ernment generally responsible for the first half (years 1-5), and the state gov-
ernment generally responsible for the second half (years 6-9). Schools are fi-
nanced through a mixture of federal, state, and municipal taxes, with federal
and state governments sending monthly transfers to municipal governments to
help finance schools and other public services. The control that the municipal
government has on the quality of its schools is significant. Municipal budgets,
including money for municipal schools, are proposed by the mayor and must be
approved by the city council. Some municipal governments even install school
principals as political appointees, a practice that Akhtari et al. (2017) show
has a negative effect on school outcomes in Brazil.
3.3 Data
I gather electoral data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE),
school employment data from RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Socias),
and other school data from Brazil’s nationwide school survey and standardized
test, Prova Brasil. The electoral data from the TSE contains the candidate’s
name, gender, occupation, education level, votes recieved, and whether elected.
I use data from the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections.
For the RAIS data, I use the years 2003, 2007, and 20103, corresponding to
the electoral terms of the electoral data, plus an earlier year to use as controls.
In the RAIS data I observe all teachers employed by the municipal government,
their wages, education level, and hours worked per week. From this I construct
6 variables of interest for each municipality-term: average teacher hours worked
per week, median monthly teacher wage, number of teachers employed, number
3Due to some data technicalities, data from 2011 forward is not currently available to me.
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of teachers employed who have a college degree, total teacher-hours worked
in the municipality, and total salary spending on teachers per municipality.
Summary statistics are shown in table 14.
Table 3.1: Teacher Employment Summary Statistics
count mean sd min max
Teacher Hrs/Week 12443 30.54278 8.862533 1.404255 44
Median Teacher Wage 12443 848.9286 596.3409 0 28279.08
Teachers Employed 12163 53.94466 46.74538 0 1434.015
N Teachers w/ College Degree 12163 40.44019 38.75794 0 490.8566
Tot. Teacher-Hours 12163 85265.54 77991.43 0 1515940
Tot. Teacher Salary Spend 12163 610787.8 644177.5 0 3.55e+07
Table 3.2: Principal Survey Questions
Variable Survey Questions
Council Meets School council is a group made up of representatives
of the school and the community, with the objective
of monitoring school activities. In this year, how
many times did the council meet?
Lack Finance Was there a lack of financial resources at the school?
Lack Resources Was there a lack of teaching resources at the school?
Lack Books In this year, was there a lack of books for the students?
For the first, respondents can answer 0, 1, 2, or 3 or more times. I code this as a binary
variable with ‘3 or more times’ indicating that the council meets. For the latter 3 variables,
respondents can anwer ‘No’, ‘Yes, but it wasn’t a serious problem’, and ‘Yes and it was a
serious problem’. I code the first at ‘0’ and the second two as ‘1’.
For other school performance measures, I use three rounds (2007, 2011,
and 2015) of Brazil’s nationwide school survey and standardized test, Prova
Brasil. I observe survey responses for principals, and test scores for students
(4th graders) for all public schools in Brazil with at least 20 students. In the
Prova Brasil principal survey, the school principal responds to a set of questions,
a subset of which are shown in table 2. Summary statistics are shown in table
3. The student score data is standardized to have mean 0 and a standard
4While there are some major outliers in the right tail of the distributions of these variables,
results are robust to windsorization.
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Table 3.3: Principal Survey Summary Statistics
count mean sd min max
Council Meets 5221 .4788355 .4995997 0 1
Lack Finance 5246 .5278307 .4992724 0 1
Lack Resources 5268 .3982536 .4895847 0 1
Lack Books 5209 .6680745 .4709496 0 1
deviation of 1. The data tells which level of government administers the school
(state or municipal), and I focus only on municipally administered schools.
3.4 Econometric Model
3.4.1 Constructing the Running Variable
In order to estimate the causal effect of a teacher being in the city council, I
use a regression discontinuity design, which will compare municipalities where
a teacher barely won a seat to those where a teacher barely did not win a seat.
This empirical strategy is important because municipalities that have teachers
on the city council may be significantly different from municipalities without
teachers on the city council, with respect to the way citizens and politicians
prioritize education. This strategy isolates exogenous variation in the amount
of teacher representation on the city council, which allows for causal inference.
My identification strategy follows closely that used by Poulsen and Varjão
(2021), which uses detailed knowledge of Brazil’s electoral system to construct
a measure for margin of win/loss. A key element to understanding the con-
struction of the running variable is the D’Hondt method, which Brazil uses to
allocate seats to coalitions of parties after all the votes have been cast. In order
to understand the D’Hondt method, consider the following example, taken from
Poulsen and Varjão (2021).
Imagine three different coalitions are competing for 6 seats in a
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fictional city council. The coalition of parties A & B receives 100,000
votes, the coalition of parties C & D receives 80,000 votes, and party
E, which is running as an isolated party, receives 20,000 votes. First,
the ‘electoral quotient’ is calculated, which is the total amount of
votes cast divided by the number of seats available. In our case, the
electoral quotient is (100, 000 + 80, 000 + 20, 000)/6 = 33, 333. Only
coalitions whose raw vote count exceeds the electoral quotient are
eligible to be awarded seats. Thus, party E is already disqualified
from winning seats, since it only received 20,000 votes. After this,





where V is the total of votes the coalition received and s is the round
of calculation (or number of seats already awarded to the coalition).
In an election where n seats are available, coalitions are awarded 1
seat for each quotient they have among the highest n quotients.
This is illustrated in the table below, where the coalition of A & B
and the coalition of C & D have both been awarded 3 seats, since
both have 3 quotients among the top 6 quotients.
D’Hondt Method Example (6 seats available)
Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Seats Won
Parties A+B 100, 000∗ 50, 000∗ 33, 333∗ 25,000 20,000 3
Parties C+D 80, 000∗ 40, 000∗ 26, 666∗ 20,000 16,000 3
Party E 20,000 10,000 6,666 5,000 4,000 0
Note: Asterisks denote quotients in the top 6. Each quotient a coalition has
in the top 6 of quotients earns them a seat.
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Because of the proportional representation system, only the last
seat filled in each municipality (city) can be considered as being ‘on
the margin’ of being flipped from one coalition to another. In the
example above, that is the seat awarded to the coalition of parties
C & D for their quotient of 26,666 (which was the lowest quotient of
the top 6). In this case, the coalition of parties A & B was also on
the margin of winning this seat, because of their quotient of 25,000
(which was the highest quotient not in the top 6).5 [I] consider these
two quotients (26,666 and 25,000) as the ‘marginal quotients’.
Seats in the legislature are filled according to a open party list system,
meaning that candidates are put in order depending on how many votes they
got, and the candidates with the most votes are given seats first.
The running variable for the sharp RD design is then constructed as the
margin of victory (or loss) for the coalition where a teacher was the candidate
associated with the ‘marginal quotient’. Specifically, for each municipality i,





where Qi,teacher is the marginal quotient for the coalition where a teacher
was the associated candidate on the party list (who either got a seat because
of that quotient, or would have if the quotient were higher), Qi,non−teacher is the
marginal quotient for the coalition without a teacher as marginal candidate,
and TotalV otesi is the total amount of votes cast for city councillors in the
election. In the example shown above, if the coalition of parties A & B had
no teacher candidates, and the coalition of parties C & D did have a teacher
as the marginal candidate, the running variable would then be calculated as
5Note that parties A & B didn’t miss winning that seat by 1,666 votes, they actually






= .0083. Municipalities where either both of the marginal
quotients are associated with a teacher, or neither of them are, are dropped
from the analysis (because there is no treatment being induced by the running
variable at that point).
In figure 3.1 I show a ‘first stage’ effect, which shows the variation in teach-
ers on the city council that the running variable induces at the cutuff. Some
municipalities in the sample have multiple teachers on the city council, which is
why the average amount of teaches on the city council goes from approximately
.5 to 1.5 at the cutoff. Thus, in the terminology of Cattaneo et al. (2016), I
use a pooled sharp RD with cumulative cutoffs.
Figure 3.1: Teachers on the City Council
Notes: Some municipalities in the sample have multiple teachers on the city council,
which is why the average amount of teachers on the city council goes from close to .5 to 1.5
at the cutoff.
3.4.2 Regression Discontinuity Model
With this running variable in hand, designed to measure the margin of victory
or loss for teachers running for city council, I run a regression discontinuity
design of the following form:
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ym,t = β0 + β1T + f(R) + β2 ∗ f(R) + β3ym,t−1 +Xi + εm,t.
Where ym,t
6 is the outcome of interest for municipality m at time t, T
denotes treatment, and f(R) is a flexible function of the running variable. The
main coefficient of interest is then β1. I also include in the regression a vector
of municipality-characteristic controls, Xi, as well as a lagged version of the
outcome variable. While not necessary for identification, these allow me to
increase the precision of the estimates7. For all of my estimates, I use the bias-
corrected and robust variance estimator from Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014). In my preferred specification, I use a triangular kernel and a quadratic
function for f(∗).
3.4.3 RD Design: Smoothness and Balance Tests
Regression discontinuity designs are valuable econometric estimators because
they can give nonparametric estimates of treatment effects under minimal as-
sumptions. The key assumption for the regression discontinuity design to be
valid is the ‘no precise manipulation’ or ‘smoothness’ assumption. I test this
assumption using the typical McCrary (2008) density test, but using the new
local polynomial density estimators put forth by Cattaneo et al. (2018). Using
this test, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation with a p-value
of .60.
6For the Prova Brasil regressions, the outcome is ym,t,s, since we observe data at the
school level.
7Estimates are robust to the exclusion of these covariates.
125
Figure 3.2: Density of the running variable (margin of victory/loss for the
marginal legislator politically opposed to the mayor). Using McCrary’s (2008)
density test, I find no evidence of manipulation of the running variable.
I also test the smoothness assumption by doing ‘placebo’ tests, that is, doing
the RD model with pre-determined variables as outcomes, to check covariate
balance. Of 28 placebo tests, I reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level in only
one case, which is roughly what one would expect from such a number of tests.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main RD Results
The main results of my analysis are presented in tables 5 through 7. Each table
contains 3 panels, containing the estimates for the whole sample, just male
teacher-politicians, and just female teacher-politicians, respectively. As can be
seen, for the main variables of interest, estimates are sometimes statistically
significant for the pooled sample, never statistically significant for the male
sample, and always statistically significant for the female sample.
In table 5 I find that having a female teacher on the city council increases
teachers weekly hours worked by 6.6 hours, increases their monthly wage by
R$302, and increases teacher employment by 25 teachers per 10,000 residents.
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Table 3.4: Placebo Tests
Native State Native Mun. Mayor Ally Num. Test Takers
Robust 0.0483 0.0891 0.0136 -8.035
(0.0756) (0.127) (0.124) (151.3)
Obs. 914 776 808 781
Clust. 828 716 743 721
Coalition Size 2nd Term Mayor Mayor Age Metro
Robust 0.0250 -0.172 -3.320 0.0196
(0.327) (0.106) (2.346) (0.0309)
Obs. 796 799 715 778
Clust. 731 735 661 704
AM Radio TV Station Internet Prov. Pop. Growth Rate
Robust -0.164 -0.164∗∗ 0.00788 0.0148
(0.113) (0.0774) (0.149) (0.0296)
Obs. 715 749 598 894
Clust. 661 692 561 801
Judiciary District Illiteracy Rate Med. Income Bookstore
Robust -0.217 0.996 0.781 -0.0510
(0.132) (2.228) (33.13) (0.125)
Obs. 691 895 859 751
Clust. 644 809 781 693
Urban Rate Pct. < 25 yrs Councillor Wage Hrs Worked
Robust 0.961 1.247 25.47 -1.924
(5.636) (1.759) (259.9) (1.625)
Obs. 754 801 807 681
Clust. 696 734 738 634
GDP Elect. GDP Gwth, Elect. GDP, Exam GDP Gwth, Exam
Robust 2.696 0.0391 0.0310 -0.00217
(2.728) (0.0354) (2.510) (0.0373)
Obs. 659 955 657 612
Clust. 617 869 616 575
Pop, Elect. Pop. Growth, Elect. Pop, Exam Pop Growth, Exam
Robust -1679.0 -0.00505 -1801.4 -0.0106
(5780.8) (0.0106) (5673.5) (0.0216)
Obs. 957 815 950 707
Clust. 870 749 865 656
Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals and bias correction.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. All the GDP variables
are GDP per capita. Both the GDP and population variables are had for both the
election year and the year of the Prova Brasil survey and exam.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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These amount to 21%, 36%, and 46% increases, respectively. These are large
effects, and though the estimated treatment is not a large change in the compo-
sition city council, it is a large change in the representation of the city’s public
education system on the city council— often going from 0 to 1 representatives,
and sometimes 1 to 2 representatives8.
In table 6 I find that having a female teacher on the city council increases the
number of teachers with a college degree, and also increases the total teacher-
hours hired out by the municipal government, as well as the total salary spend-
ing on teachers.
For many of these variables, the coefficient for male teacher-politicians is
large, but standard errors are often larger. While a failure to reject the null
hypothesis is in practice not usually seen as a reason to suppose there is no
effect, Abadie (2018) shows that null results often convey more information
than rejection results, and thus that more weight should be given to these null
results, especially when there is little prior probability of a point null. The fact
there there are consistent effects for females but not males, combined with the
fact that I do not find statistically significant results for even the most proximate
variables a male teacher on the city council may effect (for example, teacher
wage), casts doubt on any effect male teachers may have on these variables.
Moving to the outcomes from the principal survey, I find that having a
female teacher on the city council increases the likelkihood that the local school
council meets by 76 p.p., decreases the likelihood that a school has financial
problems by 21 p.p, decreases the likelihood that the school lacks teaching
resources by 49 p.p., and decreases the likelihood that the school lacks books
by 29 p.p.. In this case, coefficients for men are much smaller than for women,
and always statistically insiginificant.
Lastly, I test if these things improve test scores for students. While point
8Due to data restrictions, I cannot estimate if the specific school of the teacher-politician
is favored.
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Table 3.5: Teacher Employment Outcomes I
Teacher Hrs/Week Median Teacher Wage Teachers Employed
Panel A: Male & Female Teacher-Politicians
Robust -0.331 771.7 11.10
(2.070) (663.6) (11.50)
Observations 258 290 301
Clust. 247 278 288
Panel B: Male Teacher-Politicians
Robust -1.648 1060.2 17.51
(2.523) (1149.4) (16.97)
Observations 145 174 169
Clust. 140 168 163
Panel C: Female Teacher-Politicians
Robust 6.620∗∗ 302.2∗∗∗ 24.94∗
(2.723) (88.11) (12.86)
Observations 132 114 84
Clust. 130 112 83
Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals and bias correction.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.6: Teacher Employment Outcomes II
N Teachers w/ College Degree Tot. Teacher-Hours Tot. Teacher Salary Spend
Panel A: Male & Female Teacher-Politicians
Robust 18.43∗ 17429.9 328752.3∗
(10.12) (21037.5) (173969.1)
Observations 216 309 258
Clust. 209 296 247
Panel B: Male Teacher-Politicians
Robust 19.98 24766.6 318631.3
(14.50) (32629.5) (235233.4)
Observations 145 157 177
Clust. 140 151 171
Panel C: Female Teacher-Politicians
Robust 38.16∗∗∗ 47618.3∗∗ 697739.5∗∗∗
(9.902) (20302.7) (131113.2)
Observations 84 89 96
Clust. 83 87 94
Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals and bias correction.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: School Quality Outcomes
Council Meets Financial Problems Lack Resources Lack Books
Panel A: Male & Female Teacher-Politicians
Robust 0.203 -0.141 -0.205∗∗ 0.0422
(0.136) (0.0984) (0.0880) (0.0932)
Observations 1361 1322 1650 1433
Clust. 357 345 422 370
Panel A: Male Teacher-Politicians
Robust 0.0565 -0.0537 -0.0645 0.153
(0.151) (0.121) (0.124) (0.105)
Observations 783 824 675 750
Clust. 198 209 161 187
Panel A: Female Teacher-Politicians
Robust 0.762∗∗∗ -0.231∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗
(0.115) (0.124) (0.107) (0.141)
Observations 392 530 541 414
Clust. 111 152 154 123
Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals and bias correction.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
estimates are similar for the 3 different samples, the estimate has statistical
significance only for the female regression, suggesting a .26 standard deviation
improvement in language scores, significant at the 10% level.
These results shows that having a female teacher on the city council not
only improves teacher hiring, but also directly improves conditions at school,
and likely student learning outcomes as well.
3.5.2 Gender Effect Test
Previous economics research shows inherent differences in gender policy prefer-
ences (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2006), thus, one might
argue that the effects that I estimate in the tables above are merely gender
effects rather than ‘teacher’ effects. I test this by rerunning my RD model with
the main outcomes of interest, and rather than define treatment as having a
teacher win a seat, I define treatment as having any woman win the marginal
seat in the legislature. Results are reported in table 9. Of the 10 variables in
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Table 3.8: Student Test Scores
Language Grade Math Grade















Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
my main analysis where I find statistically significant effects for female teacher-
politicians, only 2 are statistically significant at the 5% level, with 4 being
statistically significant at the 10% level. Even for those estimates that are sta-
tistically significant, the point estimates are only a fraction of the magnitide of
my main point estimates. Thus, while gender can explain part of the estimated
effects above, it only explains a small part of it.
3.5.3 Explanation of Gender Heterogeneity
Next I attempt to offer an explanation of why results differ so much for men
versus women. One explanation is that this is simply an amplification of ex-
isting gender effects. Women may prefer strengthening the education system
over other public policies, and this would likely be amplified if that woman is
also a teacher. Another possible explanation has to do with the political career
prospects of incoming legislators on the city council, for men versus women.
In table 10 I find that women are 3.6 p.p. less likely to rerun for office in the
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Table 3.9: Gender Effect Test
Teacher Hrs/Week Median Teacher Wage Teachers Employed
Robust 1.421 40.85 21.95∗
(1.819) (65.90) (11.60)
Obs 610 678 630
Clust. 586 648 603
Teach. w/ Degree Tot. Teacher-Hours Tot. Teacher Salary Spend
Robust 13.78∗ 30529.9∗ 247564.1∗
(7.280) (16604.5) (145539.7)
Obs 630 620 681
Clust. 603 594 651
Council Meets Financial Problems Lack Supplies Lack Books
Robust 0.0681 -0.0623 -0.0968∗∗ -0.141∗∗
(0.0725) (0.0700) (0.0456) (0.0660)
Obs 3333 3444 3922 2887
Clust. 953 985 1102 822
Treatment effect using CCT robust confidence intervals and bias correction.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
city council (a 6.6% difference) and 1.8 p.p. less likely to run for mayor (a
37% difference in probability). While this is only suggestive, it may be that
men who are elected may see themselves as transitioning to a political career,
leaving their education career behind, whereas women may still see themselves
principally as school teachers, but also as temporary representatives of the edu-
cation system in the municipal government. This explanation is also consistent
with Brollo and Troiano’s (2016) interpretation, that women are less likely to
engage in politically strategic behavior— because they aren’t as motivated by
career concerns.
Table 3.10: City Counselor Career Prospects





For elected city counselors, this table shows how gender is correlated
with future political career prospects.
Year of first election fixed effects included for both estimates.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that there can be large benefits to public education when
(female) teachers get involved in politics. Because the RD model compares mu-
nicipalities with similar level of ‘teacher-politician preference’, we can conclude
that having a female teacher on the city council causes significant improvements
in the city’s education system, ranging from teacher wages and qualifications
to school supplies, finances, and test scores. Having a male teacher on the city
council seems to have no such effects. The different effect by gender has a few
possible explanations, but further work is required to fully understand them.
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